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A STUDY IN SEPARATION OF POWERS:
EXECUTIVE POWER IN NORTH CAROLINA
ARCH T. ALLEN, III*
In the past two decades, Arch Allen has represented officers of
North Carolina's executive branch in three cases critical in
developing the contours of this state's separation-of-powers
doctrine. in this Article, Mr. Allen explores the application of the
doctrine to North Carolina's system of government, concentrating
on the executive branch. The author first examines the historical
roots of the doctrine, from its constitutional underpinnings in the
eighteenth century to court cases decided this century. Next, the
author discusses the Executive Power and the Appointment Power
in North Carolina and the related power struggles that have
occurred between the legislature and the governor. In conclusion,
Mr. Allen proposes further constitutional reform to effect a unitary
executive and establish a true separation of powers in North
Carolina's government.
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"The legislative, executive, and supreme judicial powers of the
State government shall be forever separate and distinct from each
other."
-North Carolina Constitution Article I, section 6.
"The executive power of the State shall be vested in the
Governor."
-North Carolina Constitution Article II, section 1.
INTRODUCTION
Since the American states declared their independence in 1776,
the North Carolina Constitution has proclaimed the primacy of the
doctrine of separation of powers.1 The doctrine had influenced pre-
independence political philosophy, including the limited-government
theory of John Locke.' Montesquieu emphasized and expanded the
* Member, Allen & Moore, L.L.P., Raleigh, North Carolina. B.S. 1962, J.D. with
honors, 1965, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. The author was counsel of
record in three of the principal cases discussed in this article, State ex rel. Martin v. Melott,
320 N.C. 518, 359 S.E.2d 783 (1987) (representing Governor James G. Martin); Stott v.
Martin ("Stott I"), 725 F. Supp. 1365 (E.D.N.C. 1989), rev'd sub nom. Stott v. Haworth
("Stott II"), 916 F.2d 134 (4th Cir. 1990), on remand, Stott v. Martin ("Stott III"), 783 F.
Supp. 970 (E.D.N.C. 1992) (representing Secretary of Commerce Claude E. Pope and his
successor, James T. Broyhill); and Republican Party of North Carolina v. Martin, 136
F.R.D. 421 (E.D.N.C. 1991) (representing Governor James G. Martin regarding discovery
only), affd in part, rev'd in part, 980 F.2d 943 (4th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 828
(1993), on remand, 841 F. Supp. 722 (E.D.N.C. 1994), affd, No. 94-1057, 1994 WL 265955
(4th Cir. June 17, 1994). See infra notes 207-41, 300-27, 330-56, and 365-77 and
accompanying text. The author expresses his appreciation for the advice in the
preparation of this article of James R. Trotter, John V. Orth, and Martin H. Brinkley. The
views expressed are solely those of the author, and all matters discussed are of public
record.
1. See N.C. CONST. art. I, § 6; State ex rel. Wallace v. Bone, 304 N.C. 591, 595, 286
S.E.2d 79, 81 (1982); John V. Orth, "Forever Separate and Distinct": Separation of Powers
in North Carolina, 62 N.C. L. REV. 1, 3 (1983).
2. See Martin H. Redish & Elizabeth J. Cisar, "If Angels Were To Govern": The
Need for Pragmatic Formalism in Separation of Powers Theory, 41 DUKE L.J. 449, 457 &
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doctrine, warning that if "the legislative and executive powers are
united ... there can be no liberty."'3  Both Locke's political
philosophy of limited government and Montesquieu's maxim for
maintaining liberty influenced the founding fathers, especially James
Madison, who warned that the "accumulation of all powers,
legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of
one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or
elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny."4
The Supreme Court has also echoed "the famous warning of
Montesquieu, quoted by James Madison in The Federalist No. 47, that
'"there can be no liberty where the legislative and executive powers
are united in the same person, or body of magistrates."' "5
Accordingly, the doctrine of separation of powers has become
fundamental to American constitutionalism, both state and federal,
and has become a "Classical American Doctrine.
6
Madisonian principles permeate the North Carolina and Federal
Constitutions. To understand why the resulting governmental
bureaucracies act as they do, one should turn to The Federalist
No. 51, 7 where Madison proclaimed the underlying principles of
separation of powers:
In order to lay a due foundation for that separate and
distinct exercise of the different powers of government,
which to a certain extent is admitted on all hands to be
essential to the preservation of liberty, it is evident that each
department should have a will of its own; and consequently
should be so constituted that the members of each should
have as little agency as possible in the appointment of the
members of the others.'
The concept of a "unitary" executive was central to Madison's
n.31, 459-60 (1991).
3. 1 MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIr OF LAWS 152 (Thomas Nugent trans., 1823) (1748).
4. THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 329 (James Madison) (Tudor Publishing Co. 1937).
5. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 721-22 (1986) (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 47,
supra note 4, at 331 (quoting Montesquieu)).
6. Malcolm P. Sharp, The Classical American Doctrine of "The Separation of
Powers," 2 U. CHI. L. REV. 385,385 (1935).
7. See JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES Do
AND WHY THEY Do IT 28 (1989). Madison's eighteenth century writings continue to be a
relevant source of modem separation-of-powers dialogue. In recent years, "no major
Supreme Court opinion or law review article on the separation of powers has failed to
enlist Madison or Madison's Federalist in the contemporary battle for the separation of
powers." Victoria Nourse, Toward a "Due Foundation"for the Separation of Powers: The
Federalist Papers as Political Narrative, 74 TEX. L. REV. 447, 449-50 (1996).
8. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 353 (James Madison) (Tudor Publishing Co. 1937).
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advocacy of separation of powers.9 Madison's views prevailed in the
structure of the federal government, in which the executive power is
vested in an elected president,10 who has the power to appoint other
executive officers." North Carolina, however, has never applied
completely the concept of a unitary executive. The early North
Carolina proclamation of separation of powers exemplified what
Madison saw as ineffective "paper" separation between the branches
of government. 2 Madison's criticism of the state's provision for
legislative election of the governor and appointment of other officers
demonstrates that the North Carolina proclamation exaggerated its
actual application.
This Article discusses the differences between the proclamation
of separation of powers in the North Carolina Constitution and its
application to the state's executive from 1776 to the present. Part II
summarizes the state's constitutional history, while Part III details
some case-law applications of the doctrine of separation of powers.
The Article then focuses in Parts IV and V on the executive power,
especially the governor's ability to execute the laws through
subordinates selected by him and acting under his direction.
Sometimes these subordinates are statutory "officers" exercising
some of the sovereign power of the state; sometimes they are simply
state employees.'4 In either status, they are part of the modern state
9. See THE FEDERALIST No. 47, supra note 4, at 329-37.
10. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
11. See id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
12. See THE FEDERALIST No. 47, supra note 4, at 336-37.
13. See Orth, supra note 1, at 5.
14. The term "officer" is broadly defined and generally refers to one exercising some
portion of the sovereign power of the state. See, e.g., Simeon v. Hardin, 339 N.C. 358,371-
72, 451 S.E.2d 858, 867-68 (1994) (holding that district attorneys are constitutional
officers); State v. Camacho, 329 N.C. 589, 593, 406 S.E.2d 868, 870 (1991) (holding that
district attorneys are "independent constitutional officers"); Smith v. State, 289 N.C. 303,
307-08, 222 S.E.2d 412, 416 (1976) (holding that a superintendent of a state hospital is an
employee, not an "officer"); State ex reL McCollough v. Scott, 182 N.C. 865, 870, 109 S.E.
789,792 (1921) (holding that members of the State Board of Accountancy are "officers");
State ex rel. Attorney General v. Knight, 169 N.C. 333, 337-45, 85 S.E. 418, 420-24 (1915)
(holding that a notary public is an "officer"); State ex reL Wooten v. Smith, 145 N.C. 476,
477, 59 S.E. 649, 650 (1907) (holding that a public administrator of a county is not an
"officer") (In the Southeastern Reporter, this case is entitled State ex rel. Wootton v.
Smith.); State ex rel. Wood v. Bellamy, 120 N.C. 212, 224, 27 S.E. 113, 116 (1897) (holding
that directors of a state hospital are "officers"); People ex reL Welker v. Bledsoe, 68 N.C.
457, 463-64 (1873) (holding that directors of the state penitentiary are "officers"); People
ex rel. Nichols v. McKee, 68 N.C. 429, 434-38 (1873) (holding that directors of a state
institution are "officers"); State ex rel. Clark v. Stanley, 66 N.C. 60, 67 (1872) (holding that




governmental bureaucracy. In Part VI, the Article concludes with
proposals for further constitutional consolidation of the state's
executive power in the governor.
North Carolina adopted a new constitution in 1971 that included
provisions vesting the state's executive power in the governor15 and
authorizing gubernatorial appointment of "officers whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for."16  The state still
suffers, however, from the governor's sharing of some executive
power with other elected officers and from the legislature's potential
control over the appointment of other executive officers. To fulfill
the state constitution's proclamation of separation of powers, North
Carolina needs further constitutional reform to effect a unitary
executive. Before proposing some reforms, however, we should first
understand the current constitutional provisions and trace their
history.
I. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
A. Independence and the North Carolina Constitution
The North Carolina Constitution of 1776 provided that "all
political power is vested in, and derived from, the people only" 7 and
that "the legislative, executive and supreme judicial powers of
government, ought to be forever separate and distinct from each
other.1' 8 Nevertheless, the state's first constitution, like other new
states' constitutions, limited the executive power because of colonial
aversion to the Crown and its magistrates. 19 After the North Carolina
15. See N.C. CONST. art. III, § 1.
16. Id. art. III, § 5, cl. 8.
17. N.C. CONST. of 1776, Declaration of Rights § 1.
18. Id. Declaration of Rights § 4. Prior to ratification of the United States
Constitution, the North Carolina Supreme Court recognized the principle of separation of
powers in the first reported case that upheld the doctrine of judicial review and the
supremacy of the constitution over a statute. See Bayard v. Singleton, 1 N.C. (Mart.) 5, 6-7
(1787); see also Orth, supra note 1, at 7 (discussing the importance of Bayard).
19. See FLETCHER M. GREEN, CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE SOUTH
ATLANTIC STATES, 1776-1860, at 89-91 (W.W. Norton & Co. 1966) (1930); JOHN V.
ORTH, THE NORTH CAROLINA STATE CONSTITUTION 3-4 (1993); WILLIAM S. POWELL,
NORTH CAROLINA THROUGH FOUR CENTURIES 186-87 (1989); John Devlin, Toward a
State Constitutional Analysis of Allocation of Powers: Legislators and Legislative
Appointees Performing Administrative Functions, 66 TEMP. L. REV. 1205, 1224-35 (1993).
Testifying in favor of gubernatorial veto in 1985, Governor James G. Martin said, "'I
understand the eighteenth century concern about Royal Governors.... They are not
coming back: We have not had a Royal Governor for 209 years. We won!'" Ran Coble,
Executive-Legislative Relations in North Carolina: Where We Are and Where We Are
Headed, 25 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 673, 674 (1990) (quoting James G. Martin).
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Constitution of 1776 was adopted, a delegate to the constitutional
convention illustrated this aversion to executive power by
"declar[ing] that the power given the governor was 'just enough to
sign the receipt for his salary.' "20
The early experience in North Carolina and other states
"'evinced a powerful tendency in the legislature to absorb all power
into its vortex.' "21 The legislature not only elected the governor, 2
but also elected a seven-person Council of State to "advise the
governor in the execution of his office."' Some of the governor's
prescribed powers were predicated on the advice of the Council of
State.24 The legislature also appointed the treasurer,25 attorney
general, and judges.26 The governor's appointment power was limited
to filling vacancies during legislative recesses and then only with the
advice of the Council of StateY Consequently, Madison complained
that, despite the proclaimed separation of powers, North Carolina's
constitution referred to the legislature the power to appoint the chief
executive and the other principal executive officers, as well as all
judicial officers. 8
Madison's concerns over separation of powers are reflected in
the United States Constitution.2 9 After debates at the Constitutional
Convention, Madison's conception of separation of powers and
executive independence prevailed, resulting in a single executive
elected separately from the Congress. ° The executive independently
executes the laws primarily through appointees, and the executive's
appointment power is recognized explicitly.3' The Appointments
Clause provides for presidential appointment of officers of the United
States, subject to the Senate's advice and consent, with a provision for
appointment of "inferior" officers by the President, the judiciary, or
20. BENNEIT M. RICH, STATE CONSTITUTIONs: THE GOVERNOR 2 (1960) (citing
LESLIE LIPSON, THE AMERICAN GOVERNOR FROM FIGUREHEAD TO LEADER 14
(1939)).
21. Sam J. Ervin, Jr., Separation of Powers: Judicial Independence, LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Winter 1970, at 108, 113 (quoting James Madison).
22. See N.C. CONST. of 1776, § 15 (providing for the governor to serve a one-year
term).
23. Id. § 16 (providing for each member of the Council of State to serve a one-year
term).
24. See id. § 19.
25. See id. § 22.
26. See id. § 13.
27. See id. § 20.
28. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, supra note 4, at 336.
29. See Sharp, supra note 6, at 406-11.
30. See iL at 423-24.
31. See id. at 425-27.
2054 [Vol. 77
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the heads of executive departments.32 As later explained by Madison,
"if any power whatsoever is in its nature Executive, it is the power of
appointing, overseeing, and controlling those who execute the laws.
'33
After ratification of the United States Constitution, the issue of
appointment power continued to attract attention in connection with
the drafting of some states' constitutions.34 Thomas Jefferson, who
wrote extensively on the subject of separation of powers and drafted
the original separation-of-powers provision in Virginia's
constitution,35 wrote, " 'Nomination to office is an executive function.
To give it to the legislature, as we do [in Virginia], is a violation of the
principles of division of powers.' "36 At that time in Virginia and in
America generally, state legislatures dominated. As Alexis de
Tocqueville noted, "The legislative bodies daily encroach upon the
authority of the governor and their tendency ... is to appropriate it
entirely to themselves."'37
North Carolina amended its constitution in 1835 in response to
dissatisfaction with the legislative representation system and
persistent reform efforts; the changes included a provision for the
popular election of the governor for a two-year term.38  These
constitutional amendments represented "a turning point in North
Carolina history" 39 and the beginning of the state's modernization. 0
Efforts for additional state reform occurred in the 1850s,4' but failed
before secession from the Union.42 The Civil War then dominated
the state and the nation.
43
32. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
33. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 463 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789) (statement of Rep. Madison).
34. See GREEN, supra note 19, at 83.
35. See THOMAS JEFFERSON, DRAFr OF A CONSTITUTION FOR VIRGINIA (1783),
reprinted in THE COMPLETE JEFFERSON 111 (Saul K. Padover ed., 1943); Sharp, supra
note 6, at 396-97, 417.
36. State ex rel. Jameson v. Denny, 21 N.E. 252,254 (Ind. 1889) (quoting Letter from
Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Kercheval (July 16,1816)).
37. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 110-12 (Century Co. ed.,
1898), quoted in RICH, supra note 20, at 3.
38. See GREEN, supra note 19, at 224-33; HUGH TALMAGE LEFLER & ALBERT RAY
NEWSOME, NORTH CAROLINA: THE HISTORY OF A SOUTHERN STATE 332,337-38 (rev.
1963).
39. LEFLER & NEVSOME, supra note 38, at 338.
40. See Archie K. Davis, The Veil of Humility, 51 N.C. HIST. REV. 201,209-12 (1974).
41. See GREEN, supra note 19, at 265-72; Thomas E. Jeffrey, Beyond "Free Suffrage".
North Carolina Parties and the Convention Movement of the 1850s, 62 N.C. HIST. REV.
387,400-18 (1985).
42. See POWELL, supra note 19, at 334-48 (describing the political climate in North
Carolina preceding the Civil War).
43. See generally JAMES M. MCPHERSON, BATrLE CRY OF FREEDOM: THE CIVIL
WAR ERA (1988) (providing a history of the Civil War).
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B. Reconstruction and a New Constitution
During post-Civil War Reconstruction, the Constitutional
Convention of 1868 proposed a new state constitution, which became
the first of the state's constitutions ratified by the people.44 The new
Republican Party's members dominated the convention, wrote the
new constitution, and advocated its ratification.45 The Republican
Party's members included former Whigs, "carpetbaggers," and newly
emancipated and enfranchised black citizens 6 Although the party's
reign was brief, it had long-term effects on the state, both through the
reforms in the Constitution of 1868,47 which had been rejected by
both antebellum political parties, and the reactionary repudiation of
subsequent reform efforts by the Democratic-Conservatives after the
Republicans were ousted from power.'
The Constitution of 1868 strengthened the executive by
providing for popular election of the governor to a four-year term
with expanded powers.49 It also provided for popular election of the
state's lieutenant governor, secretary of state, auditor, treasurer,
44. See LEFLER & NEWSOME, supra note 38, at 461; see also RICHARD L. ZUBER,
NORTH CAROLINA DURING RECONSTRUCTION 14-17 (1975) (discussing changes made
by the Constitution of 1868).
45. See ZUBER, supra note 44, at 12-18.
46. See WILLIAM C. HARRIS, WILLIAM WOODS HOLDEN: FIREBRAND OF NORTH
CAROLINA POLITICS 219-20 (1987). The Republican Party of North Carolina was
founded in 1867 by William W. Holden, the most influential and controversial North
Carolinian of the Reconstruction era; James H. Harris, a black Holden supporter; and
others. See id. at 218-22.
47. While many convention delegates were Whigs prior to the Civil War, "the new
constitution was not the handiwork of either of the old parties but was, instead, the
product of the recently organized Republican party." Jeffrey, supra note 41, at 419. The
most detailed account of the Convention of 1868 is said to be J.G. DE ROULHAC
HAMILTON, RECONSTRUCrION IN NORTH CAROLINA (1914). See Jeffrey, supra note 41,
at 419 n.73. For a more recent and more sympathetic account, see OTTO H. OLSEN,
CARPETBAGGER'S CRUSADE: THE LIFE OF ALBION WINEGAR TOURGAE 93-115 (1965)
[hereinafter OLSEN, CARPETBAGGER'S CRUSADE]. One scholar says that Convention
delegate David Heaton, a former Ohio state senator who settled in New Bern, "played the
major role" in writing the Constitution. HORACE W. RAPER, WILLIAM W. HOLDEN:
NORTH CAROLINA'S POLITICAL ENIGMA 289 n.57 (1985). Another scholar notes that
Albion W. Tourg6e, a former Ohio lawyer who settled in Greensboro, "exerted more
influence in open debate" than any other delegate. Otto Olsen, Albion W. Tourgee:
Carpetbagger, 40 N.C. HIST. REV. 434,442 (1963) [hereinafter Olsen, Albion W. Tourgee].
The drafters of the Constitution of 1868 copied several provisions from Ohio's
constitution. See LEFLER & NEWSOME, supra note 38, at 460-61; see also POWELL, supra
note 19, at 393 (discussing the influence of Ohio's Constitution). Presumably, the drafters
were aware that Ohio strictly applied separation-of-powers principles to appointments.
See State of Ohio ex rel. Attorney General v. Kennon, 7 Ohio St. 546, 562-63 (1857).
48. See Jeffrey, supra note 41, at 419 & n.74.
49. See N.C. CONST. of 1868, art. III, §§ 1, 6-10.
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superintendent of public works, superintendent of public instruction,
and attorney general5 0 The lieutenant governor became president of
the senate,5' and the duties of the other executive officers were
"prescribed by law."52 Five of those officers constituted "ex officio,
the Council of State, who shall advise the Governor in the execution
of his office," and the Attorney General was "ex officio, the legal
adviser of the Executive Department."'53 The Executive Department
consisted of those officers and the governor, who was "vested [with]
the Supreme executive power of the State."'54 Significantly, a new
appointments clause enhanced the separation of powers by
prescribing gubernatorial appointment, with the advice and consent
of the Senate, of "all officers whose offices are established by this
Constitution, or which shall be created by law, and whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for."55
The first governor to exercise the new executive powers was
William W. Holden. President Andrew Johnson had appointed
Holden to be the state's provisional governor during Reconstruction,
and Holden subsequently was elected under the new Constitution of
1868.56 Still controversial,5 7 Governor Holden declared two counties
to be in insurrection, and he empowered state military forces to
suppress terrorism by the Ku Klux Klan against newly emancipated
and enfranchised black citizens. 8 Holden's actions caused the
military arrest of many people and aroused controversy over a writ of
50. See id. art. III, § 1.
51. See id. art. III, § 11.
52. Id. art. III, § 13.
53. Id. art. III, § 14.
54. Id. art. III, § 1.
55. Id. art. II, § 10. The Constitution of 1868 contained no provision concerning
removal power, which continues to be derived from statutory authority today. See Thad
L. Beyle, The Powers of the Governor in North Carolina: Where the Weak Grow Strong-
Except for the Governor, N.C. INSIGHT, Mar. 1990, at 27, 34.
56. See POWELL, supra note 19, at 381-85.
57. See William C. Harris, William Woods Holden: In Search of Vindication, 59 N.C.
HIST. REV. 354, 355 (1982). Through the scholarship of Professor Harris and Professor
Raper, Holden has been vindicated. See generally HARRIS, supra note 46 (providing a
biography of Holden); RAPER, supra note 47 (providing a biography of Holden). Despite
those scholarly vindications, Holden is still best known for his impeachment and
conviction. See, e.g., Coble, supra note 19, at 675 (discussing Holden's removal from office
and quoting Holden's political opponent, former Governor Zebulon B. Vance, who
described Holden's impeachment trial as "'the longest hunt after the poorest hide I ever
saw.' ").
58. The two counties, Alamance and Caswell, were the sight of the Ku Klux Klan's
most horrific terrorism. See ZUBER, supra note 44, at 27-28. These counties also "were
about the only counties in the state where the Republican party had gained strength in the
fall elections of 1868." Id.
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habeas corpus for their release 9 Democratic-Conservatives reacted
to Holden's actions by impeaching and convicting him-the first
impeachment conviction of an American governor. 0 Even before his
impeachment, 61 Holden's tenure as governor had been doomed when
his political opponents, the antebellum Democratic-Conservatives,
took control of the legislature from Holden's Republican Party in the
1870 legislative elections.62
C. An Amended Constitution and Calls for Reform
Once the Democratic-Conservatives acquired sufficient power,
they reacted to Reconstruction and its constitutional reforms by
initiating the Constitutional Convention of 1875.63 The Democratic-
Conservatives rallied behind racial politics and their desire to return
political control to "the white ruling classes of ante bellum days."'
Despite their appeals to racial prejudice, the Democratic-
Conservatives hardly had a mandate to amend the constitution. The
election of convention delegates was closer than any other election in
the state's history, with a few more total votes cast for the
Republicans.65 The two parties each sent fifty-eight elected delegates
59. See HARRiS, supra note 46, at 295-96; RAPER, supra note 47, at 190-96; ZUBER,
supra note 44, at 28-41. The chief justice of the state supreme court issued a writ of habeas
corpus and ordered its enforcement, but declined to have a sheriff serve it upon the
military commander holding the prisoners. The chief justice concluded that Governor
Holden had the authority to declare martial law in the two counties, but that he did not
have the power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus. See Ex parte Adolphus G. Moore,
64 N.C. 802, 808-11 (1870). A federal district court issued and enforced a writ pursuant to
the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867 and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. See RAPER, supra note 47, at 191; ZUBER, supra note 44, at 39-40. One
scholar has noted the irony that "the state leaders who had so adamantly opposed the
adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment and Radical Reconstruction legislation generally
were now using both to oppose Governor Holden, the early advocate of each in North
Carolina." RAPER, supra note 47, at 320 n.119.
60. See POWELL, supra note 19, at 400.
61. For historical examinations of Governor Holden's impeachment and conviction,
see HARRIS, supra note 46, at 299-308; RAPER, supra note 47, at 199-223.
62. See ZUBER, supra note 44, at 41.
63. See LEFLER & NEWSOME, supra note 38, at 470-71; POWELL, supra note 19, at
404.
64. William D. Harris, The Movement for Constitutional Change In North Carolina,
1868-1876, at 40 (1932) (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of North Carolina at Chapel
Hill) (on file with Davis Library at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill).
65. See LEFLER & NEWSOME, supra note 38, at 471; POWELL, supra note 19, at 404;
ZUBER, supra note 44, at 49; Harris, supra note 64, at 49. The Ku Klux Klan undoubtedly
contributed to the closeness of the election. It terrorized and murdered blacks and white
Republicans. See ZUBER, supra note 44, at 25-28. However, the Klan's top priority was
"weakening the Republican party." Id. at 25. The North Carolina Klan "grew in strength
as soon as the Republicans came into power and disappeared soon after the Conservatives
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to the convention, and three independent delegates attended as well.66
Had Republicans won a majority of delegates, "they would have
adjourned the convention permanently."'67 Because there was such a
narrow margin favoring revision, Republicans were able to minimize
the reactionary revision of the constitution.68  Later, in an obvious
exaggeration, the state supreme court implied that the narrow margin
favoring revision reflected "the dominant sentiment in the State.
69
Nevertheless, even after the 1875 amendments, the Constitution of
1868 remained the basic law of the state, and the amendments'
principal effect was to restore much of the former power of the
general assembly.7'
Part of that restoration of pre-1868 power to the General
Assembly resulted from the amendment of the appointments clause,
which effectively emasculated gubernatorial appointment power. The
Democratic-Conservatives' amendment of the 1868 appointments
clause was not based upon a principled objection to gubernatorial
appointment power. Rather, it reflected a legislative grasp for power
that may have reflected racial animus arising from Republican
gubernatorial appointment of blacks to some offices.7' Without
official explanation, the 1868 appointments clause was amended by
the deletion of a restrictive phrase regarding statutory officers.' As a
result, the appointments clause only applied to constitutional officers
whose appointments were not otherwise provided for; since there
were none, the clause was rendered meaningless. 73
regained control of the legislature" in 1870. Ild. at 27.
66. See ZUBER, supra note 44, at 49.
67. Id.
6& See Olsen, Albion W. Tourgie, supra note 47, at 446. One commentator has
suggested that the election was marred by fraud, but did not explain the allegations. See
id. The alleged fraud likely refers to objections to certain delegates being seated. See
HARRIS, supra note 46, at 77 (describing the "numerous objections ... made to certain
delegates being sworn in"). The most significant objection focused on two Conservative
delegates representing Robeson County. The two Conservatives had certificates from the
sheriff of the county as required by statute, while two Republicans claimed to be the true
delegates and presented certified returns of the precinct poll workers. See id The
Democratic-Conservatives were seated. See id at 77-78; OLSEN, CARPETBAGGER'S
CRUSADE, supra note 47, at 199.
69. State ex rel. Salisbury v. Croom, 167 N.C. 223,226,83 S.E. 354,355 (1914).
70. See LEFLER & NEWSOME, supra note 38, at 471; John L. Sanders, A Brief History
of the Constitutions of North Carolina, in NORTH CAROLINA STATE GOVERNMENT 795,
798 (1981). "Some of these amendments clearly increased the power of the legislative
branch of government, giving it considerable authority over local affairs and enabling the
Democratic party to regain virtual control of the state." POWELL, supra note 19, at 405.
71. See Harris, supra note 64, at 22-23,44,46.
72. See infra note 317 (noting the deleted phrase).
73. See CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1875, AMENDMENTS TO THE
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After the 1875 amendments, a generation passed with little
interest in further constitutional change.74  Members of the
Democratic-Conservative General Assembly, however, came to view
proposals for constitutional revision as further chances to repudiate
either Republican Reconstruction or subsequent Republican-Populist
Fusion 5 Moreover, although Republican-Populist Fusion enjoyed
success in the 1896 election, the Democrats returned to power after
the 1900 elections, and racial politics re-emerged, just as it had done
in the Democratic-Conservatives' "redemption" of the state from
Republican Reconstruction.76 The 1900 elections and associated re-
emergence of racial politics helped establish Democratic one-party
dominance of the state for nearly a century
7
The state supreme court decided seven cases dealing with the
appointment power between 1868 and 1914. Three cases held that,
under the appointments clause in the Constitution of 1868, the
appointment power was executive and while the General Assembly
could create statutory offices, it could not appoint the officers.78 In
four cases decided after the 1875 amendments to the appointments
clause, the court held that, under the amended appointments clause,
the General Assembly could create statutory offices and appoint the
officers. The governor's residuary appointment power had become
limited to constitutional officers-a meaningless provision since all
constitutional officers' appointments were provided for in the
constitution. Three of those appointment-power cases reflected
CONSTITUTION OF NORTH CAROLINA 10, 41 (1875); JOURNAL OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA, HELD IN 1875, at 123, 155-56, 173,
209 (1875).
74. See Sanders, supra note 70, at 798.
75. See Jeffrey, supra note 41, at 419 n.74; Joseph F. Steelman, Origins of the
Campaign for Constitutional Reform in North Carolina, 1912-1913, 56 N.C. HIST. REV.
396, 398 (1979).
76. In the ensuing gubernatorial election of 1876, the former Conservatives adopted
-the national name "Democrat," and their candidate, former Confederate Zebulon B.
Vance, narrowly defeated the Republican candidate, Thomas Settle. See POWELL, supra
note 19, at 405. This election signified "the end of effective Republican influence in the
state for many years." Id. At the time, the Democrats declared that "Vance's election
[was] evidence that the state had been 'redeemed' from the evil of Reconstruction." Id. at
405-06. On the national level, the 1876 election of Rutherford B. Hayes, a Republican,
ended Reconstruction. See ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED
REVOLUTION, 1873-1877, at 564-601 (1988).
77. See POWELL, supra note 19, at 427-39. North Carolina's Democrats believed that
"the state now was 'safe for white rule.'" Id. at 438.
7& See People ex rel. Welker v. Bledsoe, 68 N.C. 457, 460-64 (1873); People ex rel.




legislative-executive differences over appointments. 79 The fourth,
decided in 1914, resolved a dispute between appointees of one
governor and his successor.80
Beginning only one year after the court decided the last of these
appointments clause cases, five consecutive governors recommended
reform. In 1915 Governor Locke Craig asserted that the governor
should have appointment power for all statutory officers; he argued
that the governor's responsibility for his administration required him
to have the power to select his subordinates. 81 Governor Bickett, in
his inaugural address in 1917, urged enactment of a law providing that
all state administrative officers other than the elected Council of State
officers be appointed by the governor.s2  Governor Cameron
Morrison also advocated such a change and emphasized its
importance for gubernatorial accountability. s3 In 1925, his successor,
Governor McLean, added, "'An impression exists in some quarters
that the Governor controls the administration of State government,
but ... this idea is erroneous.... [T]he whole effort seems to have
been to create diffusion and lack of responsibility, rather than
executive authority and accountability.' "I To enhance executive
authority and accountability, Governor 0. Max Gardner initiated a
proposed "short ballot" constitutional amendment. Under his short
ballot proposal, fewer executive officers would be elected.' The 1929
General Assembly rejected the proposal, preferring to maintain the
status quo of electing eight executive officers other than the governor
and lieutenant governor.86
Faced with the Great Depression and the cry to reduce state
taxes, Governor Gardner authorized investigations of state
government, including a major study by the Brookings Institution. In
the Brookings Institution report, Governor Gardner noted "the
79. See State ex rel. Cherry v. Bums, 124 N.C. 761, 765, 33 S.E. 136, 137 (1899);
Cunningham v. Sprinkle, 124 N.C. 638, 641-43, 33 S.E. 138, 138-39 (1899); State Prison v.
Day, 124 N.C. 362,366-67,32 S.E. 748,749 (1899).
80. See State ex rel. Salisbury v. Croom, 167 N.C. 223, 227-29, 83 S.E. 354, 355-56
(1914).
81. See BROOKINGS INST., REPORT ON A SURVEY OF THE ORGANIZATION AND
ADMINISTRATION OF THE STATE GOVERNMENT OF NORTH CAROLINA iii (1930).
Governor Craig's remarks did not extend to the elected Council of State members.
During this period, however, some prominent and influential citizens actively advocated
they be appointed rather than elected. See Steelman, supra note 75, at 412.
82. See BROOKINGS INST., supra note 81, at iii.
83. See id.
84. Id. at iv (quoting Governor A.W. McLean).
85. See LEFLER & NEWSOME, supra note 38, at 571.
86. See id.
1999] 2061
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
diffusion of authority and responsibility in the administration of state
government."'  As Governor Gardner himself explained, the central
theme of the Brookings Institution report was "unification ... of
control for the purpose of developing flexible responsiveness of all
departments and divisions to intelligent direction."'To end that diffusion of authority and responsibility and to effect
unification, the report recommended adoption of Governor
Gardner's proposed short ballot constitutional amendment.
Governor Gardner resubmitted that proposal to the General
Assembly in 1931, but the legislature again rejected the short ballot.8 9
Nevertheless, much of Governor Gardner's legislative program
succeeded,90 and the Brookings Institution report was an important
step toward some state-government reorganization and subsequent
revision of the constitution.91
Concerning executive power, the report concluded that "the
State Government is characterized by an extreme diffusion of
responsibility"; the governor's "authority is so limited that it is
impossible for him to exercise general control over most of the state
agencies"; the governor should be "the real, as well as the nominal,
head of the administration"; and for the governor to be effective he
should have the power of appointment and removal over "al of the
heads of the administrative departments." 9 Thus, the report
recommended the creation of an executive department headed by the
governor with six bureaus, including the office of governor. The
governor would appoint the head of each bureau. 93
During this period of reform efforts, the General Assembly
created many administrative agencies, beginning with the early
occupational licensing boards.94 Most of the enabling statutes for
these agencies provided for gubernatorial appointment of the
members of the agencies, thus beginning a trend toward gubernatorial
appointments. 95 The trend continued with the creation of the
87. BROOKINGS INST., supra note 81, at iv.
88. Id. at v.
89. See LEFLER & NEWSOME, supra note 38, at 573.
90. See id at 573-74.
91. See POWELL, supra note 19, at 482-84 (discussing the impact of the Brookings
Institution's report).
92. BROOKINGS INST., supra note 81, at xxi-xxiv.
93. See id at xxx-xxxi.
94. See Frank Hanft & J. Nathaniel Hamrick, Haphazard Regimentation under
Licensing Statutes, 17 N.C. L. REV. 1, 1-2 (1939) (discussing the licensing boards).
95. See Act of Mar. 27, 1933, ch. 179, § 13, 1933 N.C. Pub. Laws 197, 199 (codified as
amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 88B-3 (1999)) (creating State Board of Cosmetic Art
Examiners); Act of Mar. 19, 1929, ch. 119, § 6, 1929 N.C. Pub. Laws 110, 112 (codified as
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Industrial Commission in 1929 and with the General Assembly's
provision for gubernatorial appointment of its members. 6 In 1931,
when the state began to expand economic regulation through
administrative agencies by creating the Banking Commission,' the
General Assembly provided for gubernatorial appointment of the
commissioner of banks and the members of the Commission, with the
advice and consent of the Senate originally required only for the
commissioner's appointment.98 The statute creating the North
amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 86A-4 (1996)) (creating State Board of Barber
Examiners); Act of Mar. 19, 1925, ch. 318, § 2, 1925 N.C. Pub. Laws 591, 591 (codified as
amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 87-2 (1999)) (creating State Licensing Board for General
Contractors); Act of Mar. 10,1925, ch. 261, § 11, 1925 N.C. Pub. Laws 503, 506 (codified as
amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 93-12 (1997 & Supp. 1998)) (creating State Board of
Certified Public Accountant Examiners); Act of Feb. 25, 1921, ch. 1, § 3, 1921 N.C. Pub.
Laws 47, 47-48 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 89C-4 (1996 & 1998 Supp.))
(creating Board for Engineers and Land Surveyors); Act of Feb. 25, 1919, ch. 78, § 3, 1919
N.C. Pub. Laws 104, 105 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-202.4 (1997))
(creating Board of Podiatry Examiners) (The original law provided for state appointment;
examiners are now appointed by governor.); Act of Feb. 26, 1917, ch. 73, §§ 1-2, 1917 N.C.
Pub. Laws 129, 129 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-139 (1997)) (creating
State Board of Chiropractic Examiners); Act of Mar. 9, 1915, ch. 270, § 1, 1915 N.C. Pub.
Laws 341, 341-42 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 83A-2 (1995)) (creating
Board of Architecture); Act of Mar. 9, 1915, ch. 178, § 1, 1915 N.C. Pub. Laws 252, 252
(codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-22 (1997)) (creating the State Board of
Dental Examiners, with members elected by the state association and only commissioned
by the governor); Act of Mar. 4, 1909, cli. 444, § 3, 1909 N.C. Pub. Laws 761, 761-62
(codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-116 (1997)) (creating State Board of
Examiners of Optometry); Act of Mar. 8, 1907, ch. 764, § 1, 1907 N.C. Pub. Laws, 1089,
1089-90 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-130 (1997)) (creating State Board
of Osteopathic Examination and Registration); Act of Feb. 4, 1905, ch. 108, §§ 5-7, 1905
N.C. Pub. Laws 118, 120 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-85.7 (1997))
(creating Board of Pharmacy); Act of Mar. 6, 1903, ch. 503, § 2, 1903 N.C. Pub. Laws 861,
861-62 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-182 (1997)) (creating Veterinary
Medical Board); Act of Mar. 4, 1901, ch. 338, § 1, 1901 N.C. Pub. Laws 490, 490 (codified
as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-210.18 (1997)) (creating what is now known as the
Board of Mortuary Science) (The original statute called the State Board of Health to
appoint, but the governor now appoints).
96. See Act of March 11, 1929, ch. 120, § 51, 1929 N.C. Pub. Laws 117,136 (codified as
amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-77 (1991 & Supp. 1998)).
97. See Pue v. Hood, 222 N.C. 310,314-15,22 S.E.2d 896, 899-900 (1942) (holding that
the legislature may create an administrative, investigatory, fact-finding agency, such as the
Commissioner of Banks, and delegate regulatory power to it); see also Cox v. City of
Kinston, 217 N.C. 391, 394-98, 8 S.E.2d 252, 256-58 (1940) (involving a grant of quasi-
judicial powers to an administrative housing authority agency). Since 1962, the North
Carolina Constitution has provided for vesting quasi-judicial powers in administrative
agencies. See N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 3; State ex rel Lanier v. Vines, 274 N.C. 486, 496-97,
164 S.E.2d 161,167 (1968).
9& See Act of Apr. 2, 1931, ch. 243, § 1, 1931 N.C. Pub. Laws 299,299-300 (codified as
amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 53-92 (1994 & Supp. 1998)). The General Assembly now
confirms the commissioner's appointment by joint resolution, while two commission
members are appointed by the General Assembly and twelve by the governor. See N.C.
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Carolina Utilities Commission also provided for gubernatorial
appointment subject to legislative confirmation.99 Although North
Carolina had fewer than one hundred administrative agencies in this
era, its administrative bureaucracy expanded, and the number of
agencies doubled within four decades.100 During that period the
Great Depression occurred, and expanded administrative
bureaucracies acquired adjudicatory and rule-making functions.'
A constitutional commission proposed general revision of the
North Carolina Constitution between 1931 and 1933. The General
Assembly approved the proposed revision, but an election-law
technicality prevented the issue from reaching the voters for their
approval.Y2 The general appointments provision, although changed
editorially, would have remained essentially the same.103 Some
GEN. STAT. § 53-92 (1994 & Supp. 1998).
99. See Act of March 8, 1941, ch. 97, § 2, 1941 N.C. Pub. Laws, 151, 151 (codified as
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-10 (1989 & Supp. 1998)).
100. See LEFLER & NEWSOME, supra note 38, at 573; see also REPORT OF THE NORTH
CAROLINA STATE CONSTITUTION STUDY COMMISSION 51-52 (1968) (discussing the need
to reduce the number of agencies overseen by the governor) [hereinafter 1968 REPORT].
101. For a discussion of the Great Depression in North Carolina, see generally
POWELL, supra note 19, at 474-95. During the Depression, much of the state government
was reorganized, and many new state government agencies were created. See id. at 483-84.
Nationally, President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Congress responded to the Great
Depression with numerous New Deal programs administered by new agencies, which have
become known as the "fourth branch" of government. Cf. DANIEL YERGIN & JOSEPH
STANISLAW, COMMANDING HEIGHTS: THE BATTLE BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND THE
MARKETPLACE THAT IS REMAKING THE MODERN WORLD 54-55 (1998) (discussing
James Landis's work in building the federal government's "fourth branch" and his
philosophy of regulation as enunciated in JAMES LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCESS (1938)). For discussions of the many constitutional confrontations that occurred
during this momentous period in the nation's constitutional history, see generally
WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, THE SUPREME COURT REBORN: THE CONSTITUTIONAL
REVOLUTION IN THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT (1995). For discussions of the separation-of-
powers implications of the expanded role of agencies, see generally Gary Lawson, The
Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REv. 1231 (1994); Geoffrey P.
Miller, Independent Agencies, 1986 Sup. Cr. REV. 41; Peter L. Strauss, The Place of
Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L.
REV. 573 (1984); Symposium, Administering the Administrative State, 57 U. CHI. L. REV.
331 (1990); A Symposium on Administrative Law: "The Uneasy Constitutional Status of
Administrative Agencies", 36 AM. U. L. REV. 277 (1987).
102. See Sanders, supra note 70, at 798; see also In re Opinions of the Justices, 207 N.C.
879, 880, 181 S.E. 557, 557-58 (1933) (stating that the constitutionally-mandated "next
general election" for submission of proposed constitutional amendments to the voters had
occurred before the statutorily-prescribed submission date of the 1933 proposal).
103. Compare THE REPORT OF THE NORTH CAROLINA CONSTITUTIONAL
COMMIsSION 23 (1932) (authorizing the governor to "appoint all officers whose offices are
established by this Constitution and for whose appointment provision is not otherwise
made"), with N.C. CONST. of 1868, art. III, § 10 (authorizing the governor to "appoint all
officers, whose offices are established by this Constitution and whose appointments are
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proposals of the Constitutional Commission of 1932 were later
adopted, but these amendments did not change the general
appointment power.104
Constitutional reform efforts abated during World War I, but
resumed in the 1950s. At the request of Governor Luther H. Hodges,
a constitutional commission was authorized in 1957. The commission
proposed rewriting the constitution, but the General Assembly did
not approve submission of the proposal to the voters. 05 Like the
proposal in the early 1930s, this proposal included only minor
editorial changes to the appointments clause. 0 6  Nevertheless,
recommendations for reform continued, coming not only from
Governor Hodges, but also from his successor, Terry Sanford.
While both Governors Hodges and Sanford advocated adopting
a short ballot constitutional amendment,1 7 Sanford separately
addressed the importance of gubernatorial appointment power in the
context of non-elective agencies, boards, and commissions.'0 In the
1960s, Governor Sanford recommended expanding the governor's
appointment power to enhance his executive authority.10 9 At the
time, North Carolina had 317 independent state government
entities."0 As a result, the state experienced "fragmentation, service
duplication, and program inefficiency within the executive branch,"
and some of its leaders recognized the need for reorganization."'
By the 1960s, national proponents of state constitutional revision
for executive and administrative reorganization uniformly advocated
the short ballot.ln Public administration theory in the 1960s favored
gubernatorial appointment of the heads of executive departments and
not otherwise provided for"). See generally Dillard S. Gardner, The Proposed Constitution
for North Carolina: A Comparative Study, POPULAR GOv'T, June 1934, at 1 (providing a
summary comparison of the provisions).
104. See Sanders, supra note 70, at 799-801.
105. See id.
106. See REPORT OF THE NORTH CAROLINA CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 15
(1959).
107. See LUTHER H. HODGES, BUSINESSMAN IN THE STATEHOUSE 303 (1962);
TERRY SANFORD, STORM OVER THE STATES 29 (1967).
108. See SANFORD, supra note 107, at 187, 195-97.
109. See Thad L. Beyle & Robert Dalton, Appointment Power: Does It Belong to the
Governor?, 54 ST. GOV'T 2,3 (1981).
110. See Jim Bryan & Ran Coble, The Organization of Boards and the Powers that
Drive Them, in NORTH CAROLINA CENTER FOR PUBLIC POLICY RESEARCH, BOARDS,
COMMISSIONS, AND COUNCILS IN THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF NORTH CAROLINA
STATE GOVERNMENT 77 (1984).
111. Id.
112. See, e.g., Bennett M. Rich, The Governor as Administrative Head, in SALIENT
ISSUES OF CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION 104-05 (John P. Wheeler, Jr. ed., 1961).
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their direct responsibility to the governor.' To achieve executive
unity, the reformers advocated "the governor's power to appoint his
principal assistants." 114 During this period, the nation experienced
unprecedented "state constitutional revision and reform."115
Part of that 1960s movement included revision of the Model
State Constitution. Its revisers recognized that "[a]ll authorities on
executive organization agree with the position embraced by the
Model State Constitution for more than 40 years that administrative
power and responsibility should be concentrated in a single popularly
elected chief executive.""' 6 Accordingly, under the Model State
Constitution, all executive power would be vested in the governor,
and all executive and administrative offices of state government
would be allocated among no more than twenty principal
departments. 117  The general appointments clause provided for
gubernatorial appointment and removal of the heads of all
administrative departments."8  As the revisers recognized,
department heads are policy makers and should be responsible to the
governor." 9
Throughout the 1960s, reformers recommended broad
constitutional revision based on the argument that "governors can
realize their full potential only when the entire constitutional
framework within which they operate has been remodeled.' °2 0 As a
leading proponent of reform explained, "For over half a century a
major reform advocated by most students of government has been the
strengthening of the governor. While progress toward this goal has
been made in several states, in most the governor remains chief
executive more in name than in fact.'1'
113. See Frank P. Grad, The State Constitution: Its Function and Form for Our Time,
54 VA. L. REV. 928,964 (1968).
114. Rich, supra note 112, at 107; see also RICH, supra note 20, at 31 (noting that in the
1960s, there was general agreement upon the objective of executive unity, ideally achieved
by the short ballot and "increasing the governor's appointment and removal powers.").
115. Grad, supra note 113, at 928.
116. NATIONAL MuN. LEAGUE, MODEL STATE CONSTITUTION 65 (6th ed. 1968).
117. See id. at 65-72.
11& See id. at 72.
119. See id
120. RICH, supra note 20, at 33.
121. Id at iv. There had been three earlier periods of state reorganization efforts. The
first included the initial publication of the Model State Constitution in 1921; the second
followed President Roosevelt's appointment of a federal commission in 1937; and the third
included "little Hoover Commissions" modeled after federal executive branch studies




D. Constitution of 1971
As part of a "national phenomenon" of state constitutional
revision, a new North Carolina Constitution Study Commission
"brought into clear focus the Governor's role as chief executive."'"
Following the recommendation of Governor Dan K. Moore, the
Constitution Study Commission of 1968 was created.' The Study
Commission considered proposed constitutional amendments and
characterized them as either "non-controversial" or "controversial"
changes. 24 In its published report, the Commission referred to the
dichotomy as "modest amendments" and "more substantial
changes."'2 Within that dichotomy, the Commission's
recommendations included three amendments of immediate interest.
First, the Commission recommended a "noncontroversial"
general constitutional "revision and amendment.' ' 26 The Commission
recommended a rewritten constitution said to contain "few
substantive changes of note" regarding the executive;2 7 this proposal
122. John L. Sanders, State Constitutional Revision, POPULAR GOV'T, Sep. 1969, at 86,
92. That focus included the distribution to commission members of copies of a series of
newspaper articles addressing the fragmentation of executive power and discussing books
by former Governors Hodges and Sanford recommending unification of executive power
in the governor. See Record on Appeal, Tr. 40-44, State ex rel. Martin v. Melott, 320 N.C.
518, 359 S.E.2d 783 (1987) (No. 61PA87) (discussing Plaintiff's Exhibit 7, a series of
articles by David Cooper written in the Winston-Salem Journal, which had been
distributed to members of the Commission); see also supra note 107 and accompanying
text (discussing the former Governors' support of the short ballot). The Commission also
discussed Bennett Rich's State Constitution: The Governor. See Record on Appeal, Tr.
43-44, Melott (No. 61PA87) (referencing Plaintiff's Exhibit 7B); see also supra notes 20, 37,
114,120-21 and accompanying text (citing Rich's book). The Commission's Subcommittee
on the Executive Department was chaired by former Governor Hodges, and it
recommended a short ballot amendment, administrative reorganization, and gubernatorial
appointment "under general constitutional authority" of "[a]l other heads of
administrative departments and agencies." FIRST REPORT OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE OF
THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT TO THE COMMrITEE ON THE STRUCTURE,
ORGANIZATION, AND POWERS OF STATE GOVERNMENT iv, 1 (June 26, 1963). The
Commission's Committee on State Government followed those recommendations as
"Second Priority Amendments." See REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON STRUCTURE,
ORGANIZATION, AND POWERS OF STATE GOVERNMENT TO THE NORTH CAROLINA
STATE CONSTITUTION STUDY COMMISSION 9 (Aug. 1, 1968). The Commission approved
the short ballot proposal and part of the administrative-reorganization proposal, but
referred the appointment-power proposal to its Editorial Committee. See NORTH
CAROLINA STATE CONSTITUTION STUDY COMMISSION, MINUTES OF MEETING OF OCT.
11, 1968, at 2.
123. See 1968 REPORT, supra note 100, at 2.
124. See Sanders, supra note 122, at 90.
125. 1968 REPORT, supra note 100, at 29.
126. Id. at 4, 9-26.
127. Id. at 31.
1999] 2067
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
contained a revised and amended appointments clause.128 In the
Commission's focus on the governor's role as chief executive, it
proposed vesting in him not merely "'the Supreme executive power
of the State'" as then provided, but rather " 'the executive power of
the State.' "129
In a separate "controversial" amendment, the Commission
proposed a short ballot whereby the number of elected executive
officers, other than the governor and lieutenant governor, would be
reduced from eight'30 to three. 3 ' The auditor, treasurer, and attorney
general would continue to be elected, while other department heads
would be appointed. Under a separate proposal to revise the
appointments clause, those officers would be appointed by the
governor without Senate advice and consent. 3 3
The Commission also recommended a separate "controversial"
amendment to reorganize the state's 200 administrative agencies into
no more than twenty-five departments. 34 The Commission noted
that no governor could effectively oversee the large and complex
bureaucracy that then existed.35
The General Assembly considered the Commission's
recommendations in 1970. It ratified the proposed rewritten
constitution and the proposed executive reorganization
amendment. 36 Those two proposals were said to promise North
Carolina "a thoroughly renovated Constitution and, insofar as the
realities of current legislative politics will allow, a modern
Constitution. ' 137 The General Assembly, however, did not ratify
Commission proposals concerning gubernatorial succession, veto
power, or the short ballot, each of which would have greatly
strengthened the governor's office . 3  Gubernatorial succession and
veto power were eventually implemented when political dynamics
changed in the 1970s and 1990s, but the short ballot has yet to be
adopted. 39
128. See id. at 14,73; infra text accompanying notes 306-16.
129. Sanders, supra note 122, at 92 (quoting N.C. CONST. of 1868, art. III, § 1; 1968
REPORT, supra note 100, at 13).
130. See N.C. CONST. art. HI, § 2(1); id. art III, § 7(1).
131. See 1968 REPORT, supra note 100, at 47-49.
132 See id. at 47.
133. See id. at 47-49.
134. See id. at 51.
135. See Sanders, supra note 122, at 95.
136. See iL at 96-97.
137. Id. at 99.
138. See id. at 97.
139. See Ferrel Guillory, The Council of State and North Carolina's Long Ballot: A
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Upon ratification, the proposed rewritten constitution and the
proposed executive reorganization amendment became parts of the
new Constitution of 1971.1 Arguably, the 1971 amendments
centered the state's executive power in its governor, subordinated the
executive roles of the other members of the Council of State, and
established the governor's power to appoint statutory officers serving
as subordinates in the executive department. As discussed in Part IV,
however, a unitary executive still eludes the state. The other elected
members of the Council of State still can act independently of the
governor on executive matters, and the new gubernatorial
appointments clause has been emasculated, allowing the General
Assembly to control appointment of some executive officers. While
subsequent amendments have permitted gubernatorial succession141
and veto,142 the governor still shares some executive power with the
other elected Council of State members. Until a short ballot
amendment eliminates that fragmentation, and until the governor is
empowered to appoint statutory officers serving as subordinates in
the executive department, North Carolina will not have a unitary
executive. Meanwhile, the North Carolina Constitution's
proclamation of separation of powers will continue to exaggerate its
actual application.
Tradition Hard To Change, N.C. INSIGHT, June 1988, at 40, 44. For articles outlining the
debate over the veto power, see generally J. Allen Adams & Abraham Holtzman, CON:
North Carolina Should Not Adopt a Gubernatorial Veto, N.C. INSIGHT, Mar. 1990, at 21;
Jack Betts, The Veto: After Half a Century of Debate, Still on the Public Calendar, N.C.
INSIGHT, Mar. 1990, at 2; Ran Coble, PRO: North Carolina Should Adopt a Gubernatorial
Veto, N.C. INSIGHT, Mar. 1990, at 13.
140. In North Carolina State Bar v. DuMont, 304 N.C. 627, 639, 286 S.E.2d 89, 96
(1982), the court erroneously suggested in dictum that the Constitution of 1971 made no
substantive changes. DuMont held that the right to trial by jury was not substantively
changed. See id. at 639-40, 286 S.E.2d at 96-97. The opinion exceeded that holding with
sweeping statements about the entire new constitution. It began correctly by recognizing
that some of the changes were substantive, although non-controversial; it ended by
incorrectly equating substantive with fundamental and controversial, saying that there had
been no such changes. See id. at 635-39, 286 S.E.2d at 94-96; see also Sneed v. Greensboro
City Bd. of Educ., 299 N.C. 609, 612-17, 264 S.E.2d 106, 110-12 (1980) (holding that the
meaning of "free public schools" in article IX of the constitution was not changed).
Nevertheless, the Constitution of 1971 made some substantive changes, however non-
controversial they may have been at the time. See, e.g., Advisory Opinion in re Separation
of Powers, 305 N.C. 767, 295 S.E.2d 589 (1982) (involving administration of budget under
article III of the constitution); Smith v. State, 289 N.C. 303, 324-25, 222 S.E.2d 412, 425-26
(1976) (involving the supreme court's original jurisdiction under article IV of the
constitution).
141. See N.C. CONST. art. III, § 2(2).
142. See id. art. II, § 22.
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II. SEPARATION OF POWERS
A. Leading Cases from Other Jurisdictions
Although this Article emphasizes the appointment and removal
of executive officers in North Carolina, the North Carolina cases are
better understood when considered in light of cases from other
jurisdictions. Generally, American courts have recognized that the
power of appointment is an executive function and that legislative
attempts to usurp that power violate the separation-of-powers
doctrine. 43
The Supreme Court first directly addressed the issue of the
appointment and removal of federal officers in Myers v. United
States,'44 a 1926 decision involving President Woodrow Wilson's
removal of a postmaster. President Wilson had appointed the
postmaster, but later removed him from office before his four-year
term had expired. Although a statute provided that postmasters of
his level could be removed only with the Senate's advice and consent,
the President removed the postmaster without the Senate's
imprimatur.145 A divided Court declared the statute unconstitutional
as a violation of the separation of powers. 6
In reaching its decision, the Court's six-member majority
analyzed the historical, legislative, and judicial implications of the
separation of powers, relying greatly on Madison's writings. 147
Regarding the executive, the Court stated through Chief Justice Taft,
himself a former President, that "[tihe vesting of the executive power
in the President was essentially a grant of the power to execute the
laws. But the President alone and unaided could not execute the
laws."'" Accordingly, the Court reasoned that "[h]e must execute
them by the assistance of subordinates ... [and] as part of his
executive power he should select those who were to act for him under
his direction in the execution of the laws."'' 49 The Court concluded by
quoting Madison's explanation of the balance of power between the
143. See, e.g., Tucker v. State, 35 N.E.2d 270, 292-93 (Ind. 1941); State of Ohio ex rel.
Attorney General v. Kennon, 7 Ohio St. 546, 562-63 (1857). See generally John Murdoch
Dawley, The Governor's Constitutional Powers of Appointment and Removal, 22 MINN. L.
REV. 451 (1938) (providing an early analysis of separation of powers and the appointment
power); Devlin, supra note 19 (providing a more recent analysis).
144. 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
145. See id. at 107.
146. See id. at 161.
147. See id. at 115-18.




legislative and executive branches with respect to appointment of
officers: "'The Legislature creates the office, defines the powers,
limits its duration, and annexes a compensation. This done, the
Legislative power ceases. They ought to have nothing to do with
designating the man to fill the office. That I conceive to be of an
Executive nature.' "150
Despite three dissenting opinions in Myers'5' and criticism of the
Court's holding from across the political spectrum,"2 President
Franklin D. Roosevelt relied upon the case when he removed a
conservative and contentious Federal Trade Commission member
whom had been appointed by President Calvin Coolidge.5 In
Humphrey's Executor v. United States,'" a setback for the President
and the New Deal,55 the Supreme Court unanimously held that the
President had exceeded his authority in removing the Commissioner
and had violated congressional for-cause limitations on
commissioners' removal. 6 Although reaffirming the Myers principle
that congressional participation in the removal of purely executive
officers is unconstitutional, Humphrey's Executor held that, at least
regarding quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial agencies such as the
Federal Trade Commission, Congress can attempt to create some
agency independence from executive control by limiting removal of
the agency officials under standards of good cause. 7
Although the decision "stunned the Roosevelt administration,' ' 8
Humphrey's Executor pleased advocates of the independence of
administrative agencies from political control and supporters of civil
service protection for agency administrators. 5 9 Later, the Court held
in Wiener v. United States60 that the President could not remove a
150. Id. at 128 (quoting 1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 33, at 582 (statement of Rep.
Madison)).
151. Justices Holmes, McReynolds, and Brandeis wrote dissenting opinions. See id. at
177 (Holmes, J., dissenting), 178 (McReynolds, J., dissenting), 240 (Brandeis, J.,
,dissenting).
152. See LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 101, at 67-68.
153. See id at 52-64,68-69.
154. 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
155. Two other setbacks for the New Deal were decided the same day. See A.L.A.
Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 541-42 (1935) (invalidating
legislative delegation under the National Industrial Recovery Act); Louisville Joint Stock
Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555, 601-02 (1935) (invalidating farm-mortgage
foreclosure moratoria under the Frazier-Lemke Act).
156. See Humphrey's Ex'r, 295 U.S. at 631-32.
157. See id.
158. LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 101, at 78.
159. See id. at 75.
160. 357 U.S. 349 (1958).
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member of the War Claims Commission, an independent
adjudicatory agency, merely to replace the member with his own
appointee. 6' Thus, although Myers rejected congressional limitations
on presidential removal of purely executive officers, Humphrey's
Executor and Wiener validated congressional for-cause limitations on
Presidential removal of members of independent agencies.
The Court reached a more Myers-like result in Buckley v.
Valeo,162 in which it held that Congress cannot reserve for itself the
power to appoint members of the Federal Election Commission
because they are charged with responsibility for execution of the
laws.163  More recently, in Bowsher v. Synar,'6 the Court held
unconstitutional a statutory provision that the comptroller general
could be removed only at the initiative of Congress.165 The Court's
opinion in Bowsher echoed Madison in reasoning that "once
Congress makes its choice in enacting legislation, its participation
ends. Congress can thereafter control the execution of its enactment
only indirectly-by passing new legislation."'"
The Supreme Court's most recent application of the doctrine of
separation of powers in an appointment-and-removal case, Morrison
v. Olson, 67 resulted in re-interpretation of prior opinions.1' s The
Court held that, because an independent counsel was an "inferior"
officer under the appointments clause, Congress could vest
appointment power in a court.169 The Court also held that
congressional good-cause restrictions on removal of an appointed
independent counsel did not violate the principle of separation of
powers. The Court cited Humphrey's Executor and Wiener but did
not rely on the quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial characterizations of
the officials involved in those cases to distinguish them from Myers;
instead, the Court re-characterized Myers as turning on something
other than whether the official in question is "purely executive."'70
Rather, the Morrison opinion said, "the real question is whether the
161. See id. at 356.
162. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
163. See id. at 109,126-27,132-33.
164. 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
165. See id. at 726-27.
166. Id. at 733-34.
167. 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
168. See Miller, supra note 101, at 90-96 (discussing prior interpretations).
169. See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 670-73; see also Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651,
666 (1997) (holding that judges of the United States Coast Guard Civilian Court of
Criminal Appeals are "inferior officers" subject to appointment by the department
secretary).
170. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 686-89.
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removal restrictions are of such a nature that they impede the
President's ability to perform his constitutional duty, and the
functions of the officials in question must be analyzed in that light."''
Then, taking the Independent Counsel Act as a whole, the Court held
that appointment of an independent counsel by a court "does not
violate the separation-of-powers principle by impermissibly
interfering with the functions of the Executive Branch."'72
Morrison discussed Myers and Humphrey's Executor as being on
opposite ends of "the spectrum."' 173 The sole dissenter in Morrison v.
Olson said that the Court had "replaced the clear constitutional
prescription that the executive power belongs to the President with a
'balancing test,' "174 while sweeping Humphrey's Executor "into the
dustbin of repudiated constitutional principles"'75 and declaring
"open-season upon the President's removal power for all executive
officers, with not even the superficially principled restriction of
Humphrey's Executor as cover. "176
Amid much commentary, 177 Morrison v. Olson and other recent
separation-of-powers opinions by the Court'78 have fueled an
academic debate over the federal executive power. 79 Despite their
171. Id. at 691.
172. Id. at 697.
173. Id. at 690.
174. Id. at 711 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
175. Id. at 725 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
176. Id. at 727 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
177. See, e.g., Rebecca L. Brown, Separated Powers and Ordered Liberty, 139 U. PA. L.
REv. 1513, 1519 (1991) (citing Morrison v. Olson as a representative example of the
Supreme Court's view of the separation of powers); Stephen L Carter, Constitutional
Improprieties: Reflections on Mistretta, Morrison and Administrative Government, 57 U.
CHI. L. REV. 357, 358-64 (1990) (analyzing the Supreme Court's reasoning in Morrison
and that case's impact on separation of powers); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Morrison v. Olson,
Separation of Powers, and the Structure of Government, 1988 SUP. Cr. REV. 1, 1-41
(analyzing the effects of Morrison on separation of powers); Peter L. Strauss, Formal and
Functional Approaches to Separation-of-Powers Questions-A Foolish Inconsistency?, 72
CORNELL L. REV. 488, 488-552 (1987) (exploring separation of powers pre-Morrison);
Paul R. Verkuil, Separation of Powers, the Rule of Law and the Idea of Independence, 30
WM. & MARY L. REV. 301, 312, 326-40 (1989) (commenting on the Court's analysis in
Morrison); A Symposium on Morrison v. Olson: Addressing the Constitutionality of the
Independent Counsel Statute, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 255,255-393 (1989).
178. See, e.g., Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 88
(1982) (holding that Congress may not give away Article Ill judicial power to an Article I
judge); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 923-1016 (1983) (dealing with separation-of-powers
issues within the context of the legislative veto); Clinton v. City of New York, 118 S. Ct.
2091, 2094-131 (1998) (dealing with separation-of-powers issues within the context of the
line-item veto).
179. See generally, Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President's Power
to Execute the Laws, 104 YALE LJ. 541 (1994) (arguing for a unitary executive); Steven G.
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apparent setback in the limited and unusual circumstances of
Morrison v. Olson, the academic advocates of a unitary executive
seem since to have persuaded a majority of the Court generally to
that view.' Moreover, in the recent public debate over the office of
independent counsel, appointment and removal were central
concerns,18 ' and the Morrison v. Olson dissenting opinion is widely
regarded as the correct one.18'
Beyond the special circumstance of Morrison v. Olson, an earlier
Supreme Court decision, Springer v. Philippine Islands,' provides
significant appointment-power precedent for other courts. Applying
Philippine separation-of-powers provisions, the Court struck down an
act of the Philippine legislature vesting appointment of the directors
of a national coal company and a national bank in the legislature.",
The Court unequivocally established that the appointment power is
executive, stating that "[1]egislative power, as distinguished from
executive power, is the authority to make laws, but not to enforce
them or appoint the agents charged with the duty of such
enforcement. The latter are executive functions."
185
Despite a dissenter's criticism that the distinction between
Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive, Plural
Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1153 (1992) (arguing for a unitary executive); Martin S.
Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725 (1996) (arguing against a
unitary executive); Michael A. Fritts, The Paradox of Power in the Modern State: Why a
Unitary, Centralized Presidency May Not Exhibit Effective or Legislative Leadership, 144
U. PA. L. Rnv. 827 (1996) (analyzing the debate over the executive power); Lawrence
Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1
(1994) (arguing against a unitary executive); Morton Rosenberg, Congress's Prerogative
over Agencies and Agency Decisionmakers: The Rise and Demise of the Reagan
Administration's Theory of the Unitary Executive, 57 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 627 (1989)
(arguing against a unitary executive); Strauss, supra note 177, at 517-22 (arguing for an in-
between approach to the executive power, or "functionalism").
180. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 922-23 (1997) (5-4 decision) ("The
insistence of the Framers upon unity in the Federal Executive ... is well known.") (citing
Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 179). See also Steven G. Calabresi, A Constitutional
Revolution, WALL ST. J., July 10, 1997, at A14 (commenting on the significance of Printz).
181. See, e.g., Archibald Cox & Phillip B. Heymann, Editorial, After the Counsel Law,
N.Y. TMES, Mar. 10,1999, at A19.
182. See, e.g., Paul T. Cappuccio, Scalia Was Right About the Independent Counsel
Law, WALL ST. J., June 29,1998, at A19. The Independent Counsel Act exprired June 30,
1999. See David Johnston, Attorney General Taking Control As Independent Counsel Law
Dies, N.Y. TIMES, June 30,1999, at Al.
183. 277 U.S. 189 (1928).
184. See idc at 198,203.
185. Id. at 202. Springer cited favorably two North Carolina Supreme Court cases
decided under the Constitution of 1868, State ex rel. Clark v. Stanley, 66 N.C. 60 (1872),
and State ex rel. Howerton v. Tate, 68 N.C. 546 (1873). See Springer, 277 U.S. at 204. See
infra note 196 and accompanying text for a discussion on Clark and Howerton.
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legislative and executive action may not always be done "with
mathematical precision" or the branches divided "into watertight
compartments,' 1 86 other courts have found Springer to be persuasive
precedent. For instance, the Ninth Circuit followed Springer in
holding that a commonwealth constitution's provision for separation
of powers was violated by a statute permitting appointment by the
legislature of members of a civil service commission.Y7 Additionally,
a state supreme court followed Springer in voiding a statutory
provision for legislative appointments to the state board of education
as violating the separation of powers. Other state courts have
reached similar results.8 9 Of course, some divergence exists among
the cases, some of which are distinguishable because of particular
state constitutional provisions. 90 Generally, however, the importance
and force of the separation-of-powers doctrine has been consistently
recognized,'9 and decisions by the Supreme Court and other courts
have influenced North Carolina Supreme Court separation-of-powers
decisions.'9
186. Springer, 277 U.S. at 211 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
187. See Camacho v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 666 F.2d 1257, 1263-64 (9th Cir. 1982),
abandoned on other grounds in In re McLinn, 739 F.2d 1395,1397 (9th Cir. 1984).
188. See Rampton v. Barlow, 464 P.2d 378,381-83 (Utah 1970).
189. See, e.g., Spradlin v. Arkansas Ethics Comm'n, 858 S.W.2d 684, 688 (Ark. 1993)
(holding that designating the chief justice of the state supreme court to appoint a member
of the state ethics commission violated the state's separation-of-powers doctrine);
Legislative Research Comm'n v. Brown, 664 S.W.2d 907, 924 (Ky. 1984) (holding that
statutorily creating an independent legislative commission to carry out functions of the
state general assembly is a violation of separation of powers); Opinion of the Justices, 309
N.E.2d 476, 480-82 (Mass. 1974) (holding that a legislative-created administrative
commission would violate the state's constitutional separation-of-powers provision);
Tucker v. State, 35 N.E.2d 270, 304-05 (Ind. 1941) (holding that a legislative act affecting
the terms and tenure of administrative agency employees was a usurpation of executive
power and, thus, a violation of the state's separation-of-powers doctrine). See also Sheryl
G. Synder & Robert M. Ireland, The Separation of Governmental Powers Under the
Constitution of Kentucky: A Legal and Historical Analysis of L.R.C. v. Brown, 73 KY. L.
165, 167-233 (1984-85) (providing a legal and historical analysis of Brown).
190. Compare State ex rel. Schneider v. Bennett, 547 P.2d 786, 799-800 (Kan. 1976)
(holding that members of the state legislature may serve on administrations or
commissions created by legislative enactments without violating the separation-of-powers
doctrine but only where such service results in no actual usurpation of powers of another
branch of government), with Brown, 664 S.W.2d 907, 914 (holding that the state's
separation-of-powers doctrine must be strictly construed, and that a legislatively-created,
independent agency acting on behalf of the legislature was an unconstitutional usurpation
of executive power). See Devlin, supra note 19, at 1136-44.
191. See, e.g., State ex rel. Young v. Brill, 111 N.W. 639,644-49 (Minn. 1907) (discussing
numerous separation-of-powers cases in different states).
192. See State ex rel. Wallace v. Bone, 304 N.C. 591,601-06,286 S.E.2d 79, 84-87 (1982)
(noting various Supreme Court and other state decisions regarding separation of powers in
support of North Carolina's application of the doctrine). Problems can arise in applying
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B. North Carolina Cases
Among other North Carolina separation-of-powers cases,193
appointment-and-removal 94 cases first arose after adoption of the
federal and other jurisdictions' separation-of-powers decisions to a particular state
constitutional provision. See Devlin, supra note 19, at 1219-24 (commenting on the limits
of applying federal precedent to state separation-of-powers issues).
193. See, e.g., Adams v. North Carolina Dep't of Natural and Econ. Resources, 295
N.C. 683, 702, 249 S.E.2d 402, 413 (1978) (holding that delegation of power to regulatory
commission did not violate separation of powers); Person v. Watts, 184 N.C. 499, 502, 115
S.E. 336,339 (1922) (involving executive independence); Long v. Watts, 183 N.C. 99, 105-
06, 110 S.E. 765,767-68 (1922) (involving judicial independence); Herndon v. The Imperial
Fire Ins. Co., 111 N.C. 384, 385-86, 16 S.E. 465, 465 (1892) (stating that the court's powers,
duties, and rules are free from legislative interference); Horton v. Green, 104 N.C. 400,
401, 10 S.E. 470, 470 (1889) (stating the same); State ex rel. Scarborough v. Robinson, 81
N.C. 409,425-26,429 (1879) (stating that "the judicial power cannot be exercised in aid of"
another branch's function). See also Wake County Hosp. Sys., Inc. v. Rules Review
Comm'n of the N.C. Gen. Assembly, No. 97 CVS 1426, General Court of Justice, Superior
Court Division, Wake County, North Carolina (voluntary dismissals filed June 18, 1997,
and October 15, 1997) (involving separation-of-powers challenges to review of
administrative agency rules by rules review commission). Through 1995 amendments to
the Administrative Procedures Act, see ch. 507, § 27.8(e)-(f), 1995 N.C. Sess. Laws 1525,
1723-29 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 150B-21.3(b), -21.8(c), -21.9, -21.10
(1995)), the Rules Review Commission, controlled by the General Assembly, may prevent
an administrative agency in the executive branch from implementing a rule that is not
approved by the commission. Actions of the commission have created controversy. See,
e.g., Michael Lowrey & John Hood, Regulation in North Carolina: A Primer, JOHN
LOCKE FOUND., Mar. 1997, at 12-17 (analyzing the function and impact of the Rules
Review Commission and proposing regulation reform). As challenges have occurred in
other states to such rules-review provisions, it is reasonable to expect further challenge to
these North Carolina provisions. See Missouri Coalition for the Env't v. Joint Comm. on
Admin. Rules, 948 S.W.2d 125, 133 & n.17 (Mo. 1997) (holding that a statutory provision
suspending promulgation of rules unconstitutionally interferes with the executive branch,
but upholding a legislative committee review of executive regulatory actions) (citing
Kenneth D. Dean, Legislative Veto of Administrative Rules in Missouri: A Constitutional
Virus, 57 Mo. L. REV. 1157, 1216 (1992) ("At some point the right case will arise
challenging the powers of the JCAR. It should come as no surprise to anyone when those
powers are ruled unconstitutional.")).
194. The North Carolina Supreme Court recognized the principle of separation of
powers in refusing to interfere with the governor's removal of an administrative officer.
See State ex rel. Caldwell v. Wilson, 121 N.C. 425,472,28 S.E. 554, 562-63 (1897). With a
rhetorical flourish, the Caldwell court explained its role in separation-of-powers disputes:
We realize the responsibilities of this Court in settling the line of demarkation
between the legislative, executive and supreme judicial powers, which, by
constitutional obligation, must be kept forever separate and distinct. This vital
line must be drawn by us alone, and we will endeavor to draw it with a firm and
even hand, free alike from the palsied touch of interest and subserviency and the
itching grasp of power. Should the legislative or executive departments of the
State cross that line we will put them back where they belong; but upon us rests
the equal obligation of keeping upon our own side. This is a question not of
discretion, but of law; a matter not of expediency, but of right.
Id at 471, 28 S.E. at 562. See also Person v. Watts, 184 N.C. 499, 502, 115 S.E. 336, 339
(1922) (holding that the court will not compel administrative officer to act). "As to the
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Constitution of 1868 and its new appointments clause.195 As early as
1872, the North Carolina Supreme Court held that the general
appointment power was vested exclusively in the governor and that a
statute depriving him of that power for a particular statutory office
and placing it in the legislature was unconstitutional.196  That
precedent controlled in two subsequent decisions."9 After the 1875
amendments to the appointments clause, however, the court held that
those cases no longer controlled and that the legislature could provide
for appointment of statutory officers.198  Separation-of-powers
arguments could not overcome the effect of the 1875 amendments.1 99
After North Carolina adopted the Constitution of 1971, but
before its new appointments clause became an issue for the North
Carolina Supreme Court, the court decided a significant separation-
of-powers case, Wallace v. Bone,2°° and rendered a significant
advisory opinion, In re Separation of Powers.20? The court's emphatic
language about strict application of the doctrine stirred academic
commentary.2° In re Separation of Powers advised that, under the
wisdom of this [separation-of-powers] provision there is practically no divergence of
opinion-it is the rock upon which rests the fabric of our government." Ia at 502, 115 S.E.
at 339.
195. N.C. CONsT. of 1868, art. 1II, § 10.
196. See State ex rel. Clark v. Stanley, 66 N.C. 60, 66-67 (1872) (invalidating a statute
that authorized the president of the senate and the speaker of the house to appoint
directors for the state to all corporations in which the state was a stockholder). See also
State ex rel. Howerton v. Tate, 68 N.C. 546, 551-53 (1873) (holding that the governor's
appointees to the board of directors of a railroad corporation in which the state was a
stockholder could not be displaced by proxies acting under statute controverting
gubernatorial appointment).
197. See People ex rel. Nichols v. McKee, 68 N.C. 429, 435-39 (1873) (involving
appointments to the board of a state institution); People ex rel. Welker v. Bledsoe, 68 N.C.
457, 458-59 (1873) (involving appointments to the board of directors of the state
penitentiary).
198. See State ex rel. Cherry v. Burns, 124 N.C. 761, 765, 33 S.E. 136, 137 (1899)
(applying an act that created office of keeper of the capitol and provided that legislature
could fill it); Cunningham v. Sprinkle, 124 N.C. 638, 642-43, 33 S.E. 138, 139 (1899)
(involving appointment of members of the Board of Agriculture pursuant to an 1875 state
constitutional amendment directing establishment of the department); State Prison v. Day,
124 N.C. 362, 366, 32 S.E. 748, 749 (1899) (involving the superintendent of state prison);
State ex rel. Ewart v. Jones, 116 N.C. 570, 571-74, 21 S.E. 787, 787-88 (1895) (applying an
act that created a judgeship and provided that the legislature should fill the vacancy
declared to be caused upon ratification of the act).
199. See Cunningham, 124 N.C. at 642-43,33 S.E. at 139.
200. State ex rel. Wallace v. Bone, 304 N.C. 591,286 S.E.2d 79 (1982).
201. Advisory Opinion in re Separation of Powers, 305 N.C. 767,295 S.E.2d 589 (1982).
202. See generally LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH COMMISSION, SEPARATION OF POWERS,
REPORT TO THE 1983 GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF NORTH CAROLINA (1983) (assessing the
impact of Wallace v. Bone on North Carolina agencies); Milton S. Heath, Jr., The
Separation of Powers in North Carolina, POPULAR GOv'T, Fall 1982, at 19; Orth, supra
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specific constitutional provision for administration of the state budget
by the governor and the general provision for separation of powers,
the governor, not the General Assembly, controlled transfers within
the budget and disbursement of federal block grants to the state.2°
Wallace v. Bone held that, as a matter of separation of powers,
legislators could not serve as members of a statutorily created agency
within the executive branch.2°4 As explained by the court, the
legislature cannot create an executive agency to implement legislation
and effect some control over the agency by appointing legislators to
the agency.20 5
That principle could mean that the legislature cannot
constitutionally create an executive agency and then exercise some
control over it indirectly by providing for non-executive appointment
to the agency. But that issue was not presented in Wallace v. Bone or
In re Separation of Powers, and, as one scholar noted, it was among
important unanswered questions concerning the appointment power
awaiting authoritative interpretation of the appointments clause of
the Constitution of 1971.206
Such an opportunity arose in Martin v. Melott.2 07 For the first
time under the Constitution of 1971 and for the first time in nearly a
century, Martin v. Melott presented a constitutional confrontation
concerning the governor's power to appoint state officers whose
offices are created by statute.2es In Melott, the Governor challenged
statutory appointment provisions in the 1985 amendments to the state
Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") creating an Office of
Administrative Hearings and its director.2 9 Although another
note 1; John V. Orth, Separation of Powers: An Old Doctrine Triggers a New Crisis, N.C.
INSIGHT, May 1982, at 36.
203. See In re Separation of Powers, 305 N.C. at 775-77,295 S.E.2d at 593-94.
204. See Wallace, 304 N.C. at 608-09,286 S.E.2d at 88-89.
205. See id, at 608,286 S.E.2d at 88.
206. Orth, supra note 1, at 2,25-26.
207. State ex rel. Martin v. Melott, 320 N.C. 518, 359 S.E.2d 783 (1987) (plurality
opinion). See Charles Herman Winfree, Note, State ex rel. Martin v. Melott: The
Separation of Powers and the Power to Appoint, 66 N.C. L. REV. 1109, 1109-22 (1988)
(examining the separation-of-powers doctrine and its incorporation into the federal and
North Carolina constitutions); Devlin, supra note 19, at 1246 & nn.141-44 (criticizing
North Carolina's approach to separation-of-powers cases as analyzed in Martin v. Melott).
208. See State ex rel. Salisbury v. Croom, 167 N.C. 223, 226-29, 83 S.E. 354, 354-56
(1914) (upholding legislative appointment of the director of the State Hospital, an office
not provided for in the state constitution).
209. Act of July 12, 1985, ch. 746, § 2, 1985 N.C. Sess. Laws 987, 1012 (codified as
amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 7A-750 to -752 (1995 & Cum. Supp. 1998)); Act of July
15, 1986, ch. 1022, §§ 3-4, 1985 N.C. Sess. Laws 602, 605 (codified as amended at N.C.
GEN. STAT. §§ 7A-752 to -753 (1995)) (Regular Session, 1986).
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legislator had proposed that the director be appointed by the
governor, after the election of Governor James G. Martin in 1984, the
legislative sponsor of the amendments changed the proposal to
appointment by the General Assembly.21 He later abandoned that
legislative-appointment proposal as being too controversial.' The
enacted amendments instead provided for the appointment of the
officer by the chief justice of the North Carolina Supreme Court or, in
the event the supreme court issues an opinion that the appointment
by the chief justice is unconstitutional, by the attorney general.1 2
The amendments to the APA reflected perceived abuses by
executive departments and agencies and created the Office of
Administrative Hearings to address the abuses. 13 Underlying those
perceptions and enactments, however, philosophical and partisan
political considerations were manifest. The APA always had
legislative-versus-executive power implications. Now, however, it had
partisan political-party implications -a Democrat-controlled
legislature amended the APA, arguably to curb a newly elected
Republican Governor.2 4  Nevertheless, after Governor Martin
210. BILL FINGER, ET AL., ASSESSING THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE Acr 11
(1985).
211. See id.
212. See Act of July 12, 1985, ch. 746, § 2, 1985 N.C. Sess. Laws 987, 1012 (codified as
amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 7A-750 to -752 (1995 & Cum. Supp. 1998)); Act of July
15, 1986, ch. 1022, §§ 3-4, 1985 N.C. Sess. Laws 602, 605 (codified as amended at N.C.
GEN. STAT. §§ 7A-752 to -753 (1995)) (Regular Session, 1986). The supreme court
declined to issue an advisory opinion. See In re Response to Request for Advisory
Opinion, 314 N.C. 679,682,335 S.E.2d 890,892 (1985).
213. Chapter 746 of the 1985 North Carolina Session Laws created the Office of
Administrative Hearings as "an independent, quasi-judicial agency under Article IlI, Sec.
11 of the Constitution... [with] such judicial powers as may be reasonably necessary as an
incident to the accomplishment of the purposes for which it was created." See N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 7A-750 (1995 & Cum. Supp. 1998). One purpose was "to provide a source of
independent hearing officers to preside in administrative cases and thereby prevent the
commingling of legislative, executive, and judicial functions in the administrative process."
Id. In his challenge to the appointment provisions pertaining to the Office, Governor
Martin noted, but did not assert, arguments that other parts of the act creating the Office
are unconstitutional, "especially on grounds that they established an unauthorized court
and delegate to an administrative agency excessive judicial powers." Brief for Appellant at
13-14 & nn.3-5, State ex reL Martin v. Melott, 320 N.C. 518, 359 S.E.2d 783 (1987) (No.
61PA87). Controversies continue about agencies' actions and the role of the Office of
Administrative Hearings. See James Eli Shiffer, 'Law Judges' Debate Heats Up, NEWS &
OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), June 10, 1999, at 1A (discussing N.C. House Bill 968, 1999
Session, An Act to Modify the Procedures Concerning Final Administrative Decisions in
Contested Cases Heard by the Office of Administrative Hearings).
214. The act had long
been a political football ... straining such close Democratic friendships as that
between [then] former Gov. James B. Hunt [sic] Jr. and current [1985] Lt. Gov.
Robert B. Jordan I....
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challenged the appointment provisions, the person appointed by the
chief justice to the office of director proclaimed that the controversy
was "not a question of this governor vs. this General Assembly ....
It's a question of executive power vs. legislative power.
215
Governor Martin challenged the appointment provisions of the
APA amendments as violations of the doctrine of separation of
powers without success, garnering only one limited dissenting opinion
on that basis.2 16 The Governor's separate challenge under the
appointments clause also failed, as discussed below. 217 The only
authoritative result of that challenge was its rebuff. The seven-
member supreme court split: After the chief justice recused
himself,218 three justices joined in a plurality on certain grounds,219 two
concurred in the result on other grounds,z0 and one dissented on
limited separation-of-powers grounds only involving the
independence of the judiciary."
The plurality in Melott rejected the Governor's argument that
the principle of Wallace v. Bone-that the General Assembly cannot
constitutionally create an agency of the executive branch and retain
some control over it by appointing legislators to the agency's
governing body-should prevent legislative control over an executive
officer by providing for the officer's appointment by someone other
than the governor. Without elaboration, the plurality simply said,
"Wallace is not authority for this case."'' Ignoring the clear statutory
With Gov. James G. Martin, a Republican, taking over control over the
executive branch, the political stew [was] thickened. The central APA issue-
legislative-versus-executive control over the mechanisms of government-now
has become part of the larger struggle of partisan politics.
FINGER, supra note 210, at 3-4. At that time, the General Assembly was controlled by
Democrats and dominated by a small group of powerful leaders. See The Democratic
Dictatorship ... and Other Legislative Skirmishes, THE INDEPENDENT, July 18-Aug. 14,
1986, at 1.
215. Steve Riley, Judge Decides Chief Justice to Appoint Hearings Chief, NEWS &
OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Dec. 2, 1986, at 1-2C (quoting Robert A. Melott, director of
the Office of Administrative Hearings).
216. See Melott, 320 N.C. at 528,359 S.E.2d at 789 (Martin, J., dissenting).
217. See infra text accompanying notes 300-27.
21& See Melott, 320 N.C. at 524,359 S.E.2d at 787 (plurality opinion).
219. See id. at 520, 359 S.E.2d at 785 (plurality opinion). Justice Webb wrote the
opinion and was joined by Justices Frye and Mitchell. See id. at 518, 520, 359 S.E.2d at
784-95.
220. See id. at 524, 528, 359 S.E.2d at 787, 789 (Meyer, J., concurring in result). Justice
Whichard joined the opinion. See iL at 518, 359 S.E.2d at 784.
221. See id. at 528,359 S.E.2d at 789 (Martin, J., dissenting).
222. Id at 523, 359 S.E.2d at 786 (plurality opinion).
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provision that the new agency is part of the executive branch,'m the
plurality deemed it unnecessary to decide whether the director is in
the executive branch. Assuming that the director is in the executive
branch, the plurality formulated the issue as functional: Whether the
appointment of the director is the exercise of executive power. 4 The
plurality then held that the appointment of the director "is not an
exercise of the executive power."' Citing only Advisory Opinion in
re Separation of Powers, the plurality simply equated executive power
with executing the law. 6  Reasoning that the appointment of
someone to execute the laws does not require the appointing party to
execute the laws, the plurality concluded that "the appointment
power is not the same as taking care that the laws are executed." 7
Thus, the plurality concluded that the chief justice's appointment of
the executive branch agency's director did not violate the
constitutional provision for separation of powers.tm
The concurring opinion found the plurality's analysis to be
"flawed," 9 reasoning that the separation-of-powers issue turns
instead on the nature of the powers and the duties exercised by the
appointed officer.Z30 The concurrence then concluded that the
director's statutory powers and duties are primarily judicialP' Thus,
it too concluded that the chief justice could constitutionally appoint
the director 32
The lone dissenter in Melott acknowledged that some of the
director's powers and duties may be described as "quasi-judicial," but




The dissent correctly noted that the office of director is within the
executive branch.P Nevertheless, the dissent concluded, without
explanation, that the governor has no authority to appoint the
director, unless such power be granted by the General Assembly, and
that the General Assembly "can delegate the appointment ... to
223. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-750 (1995) (providing that it is "an independent, quasi-
judicial agency under Article III, Sec. 11 of the Constitution").
224. Melott, 320 N.C. at 523,359 S.E.2d at 787 (plurality opinion).
225. Id. (plurality opinion).
226. Id. (plurality opinion).
227. Id. at 523-24, 359 S.E.2d at 787 (plurality opinion).
228. See id at 524,359 S.E.2d at 787 (plurality opinion).
229. Id. at 525,359 S.E.2d at 787 (Meyer, J., concurring in result).
230. Id at 525, 359 S.E.2d at 788 (Meyer, J., concurring in result).
231. Id at 526, 359 S.E.2d at 788 (Meyer, J., concurring in result).
232- See id. at 528, 359 S.E.2d at 789 (Meyer, J., concurring in result).
233. Id. at 530-31, 359 S.E.2d at 790-91 (Martin, J., dissenting).
234. See id. at 531-32, 359 S.E.2d at 791 (Martin, J., dissenting).
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another official." 5  Under the dissent's separation-of-powers
analysis, however, the other official cannot constitutionally be the
chief justice. With a rhetorical flourish, the dissent complained that by
placing this appointment with the chief justice, "the judicial branch
has been cast adrift upon uncharted waters amid the rocky shoals of
political influence. The genius of the doctrine of separation of powers




All three Melott opinions clearly retreated from the rhetoric and
principle of Wallace v. Bone and ignored other leading separation-of-
powers casesP 7 Nevertheless, two of the opinions hinted that the
separation-of-powers provision would be applied more strictly in
other circumstances. The dissent in Melott speculated that the court
would not approve the General Assembly's delegating to the chief
justice the appointment of members of other executive agencies.z 8
The concurring opinion in Melott interjected that it did "not mean to
say that, under different circumstances, the principles of separation of
powers would not render similar legislation unconstitutional." 9 The
retreat from Wallace v. Bone and the vague suggestion about other
potential applications of the principles of separation of powers may
be a result of changes in court membership occurring between
Wallace v. Bone and Martin v. Melott.2 40 Moreover, the politics of the
235. Id. at 533, 359 S.E.2d at 792 (Martin, J., dissenting).
236. Id. (Martin, J., dissenting). Other jurisdictions that adhere to the separation-of-
powers doctrine and have considered the issue of judicial appointment of non-judicial
officers have held that the appointments are unconstitutional. See, e.g., Spradlin v.
Arkansas Ethics Comm'n, 858 S.W.2d 684,688 (Ark. 1993) (holding that state chief justice
cannot constitutionally appoint one member of commission); State ex rel. White v. Barker,
89 N.W. 204, 209-10 (Iowa 1902) (holding that judges cannot constitutionally appoint
board members); Opinion of the Justices, 309 N.E.2d 476, 479-80 (Mass. 1974) (holding
that state chief justice cannot constitutionally appoint non-judicial officers or board
members); State ex rel Young v. Brill, 111 N.W. 639, 651 (Minn. 1907) (holding that
district judges cannot constitutionally appoint board members); Application of O'Sullivan,
158 P.2d 306, 309-10 (Mont. 1945) (holding that judicial appointment of city attorney is
unconstitutional).
237 See, e.g., Springer v. Phillipine Islands, 277 U.S. 189, 197-212 (1928) (regarding an
act by the Phillipine legislature that vested executive appointment power in the
legislature); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 106-295 (1926) (regarding the power of
the President to remove a postmaster from his appointed position). See also supra notes
144-52 and accompanying text (discussing Myers); supra notes 183-88 and accompanying
text (discussing Springer).
23& See Melott, 320 N.C. at 531,359 S.E.2d at 791 (Martin, J., dissenting).
239. Id. at 527,359 S.E.2d at 789 (Meyer, J., concurring in result).
240. Justice Britt, who wrote for the court in Wallace v. Bone, and Chief Justice
Branch, sitting at that time, both retired before Melott was decided. See 320 N.C. at vii
(noting that Chief Justice Branch and Justice Britt were both retired in 1987, when Melott
was decided); 304 N.C. at v (noting that Chief Justice Branch and Justice Britt were sitting
in 1981, when Wallace v. Bone was decided).
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state and the political party affiliation of the governor had also
changed.241
III. THE EXECUTIVE POWER AND THE APPOINTMENT
POWER IN NORTH CAROLINA
A. Constitutional and Statutory Provisions
The Constitution of 1971 vests the "executive power of the State
... in the Governor."'242 It provides for the governor's election to a
four-year term and qualifications, 43 other attributes of office,2' and
for the governor's "oath or affirmation that he will support the
Constitution and laws of the United States and of the State of North
Carolina, and that he will faithfully perform the duties pertaining to
the office of Governor." 245
The Constitution of 1971 enumerates ten specific duties of the
governor, three of which are emphasized here:
Budget. The Governor shall prepare and recommend to the
General Assembly a comprehensive budget of the
anticipated revenue and proposed expenditures of the State
for the ensuing fiscal period. The budget as enacted by the
General Assembly shall be administered by the Governor.
Execution of laws. The Governor shall take care that the
241. See Coble, supra note 19, at 686-88 (noting that separation-of-powers disputes at
the time of Wallace v. Bone were between a Democratic governor, Governor Hunt, and
Democratic majority leaders in the General Assembly, and that the dispute in Melott was
between a Republican governor and Democratic majority leaders in the General
Assembly). See also Republican Majority on High Court, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh,
N.C.), Jan. 2, 1999, at 3A (noting that for the first time since early this century the state
supreme court has a majority of Republican justices).
242. N.C. CONST. art. III, § 1. Judicial interpretation of the meaning of "executive
power" is sparse in North Carolina. See Melott, 320 N.C. at 523, 359 S.E.2d at 787
(plurality opinion) ("We believe it means 'the power of executing laws.' "). North
Carolina courts have explicitly recognized that the governor has standing in a declaratory
judgment action regarding the interpretation of statues administered by another
constitutional executive officer, see State ex reL Hunt v. North Carolina Reinsurance
Facility, 302 N.C. 274, 280-81, 275 S.E.2d 399, 400-01 (1981), and implicitly that the
governor may make a legal determination that a statute is unconstitutional and direct the
attorney general to commence an action challenging its constitutionality, see State ex rel.
Attorney General v. Knight, 169 N.C. 333, 334-63, 85 S.E. 418, 419-32 (1915) (testing a
woman's right to be a notary public in light of a gubernatorial power to appoint women as
such).
243. See N.C. CONST. art. III, § 2.
244. See id. § 3.
245. Id § 4.
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laws be faithfully executed.
Appointments. The Governor shall nominate and by and
with the advice and consent of a majority of the Senators
appoint all officers whose appointments are not otherwise
provided for.2'
The Constitution of 1971 provides for the election of a lieutenant
governor, who presides over the Senate and who "shall perform such
additional duties as the General Assembly or the Governor may
assign to him."'247 It also provides for the election of eight other
constitutional officers - a secretary of state, an auditor, a treasurer, an
attorney general, a superintendent of public instruction, and
commissioners of agriculture, labor, and insurance248-whose
"respective duties shall be prescribed by law."249 Those eight officers,
together with the governor and the lieutenant governor, as the ten
constitutional officers whose offices are established by the executive
article of the constitution, comprise the Council of State, with no
collective powers or duties constitutionally prescribed 5 °
In re-allocating an earlier array of two hundred state agencies
under not more than twenty-five principal administrative
departments, the drafters of the constitutional reorganization
amendment contemplated that the governor would "be enabled to
manage the business of the State more effectively.' 251 But because of
the failure of the short ballot proposal, eight of the heads of those
principal administrative departments remained independently elected
constitutional officers, with duties "prescribed by law,"' 212 while the
other department heads were dependent upon statutory authorization
and prescription of duties. Accordingly, the General Assembly
enacted executive organization acts in 197111 and 1973.1 Those Acts
recognized the constitutional concept that the governor was the chief
executive officer of the state,255 but vested executive and
246. Id. § 5.
247. Id § 6.
248. See id. § 7(1).
249. Id. at § 7(2).
250. See id. at § 8.
251. 1968 REPORT, supra note 100, at 51-52.
252. N.C. CONST. art. III, § 7(2).
253. See Act of July 14, 1971, ch. 864,1971 N.C. Sess. Laws 1266 (codified at N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 143A-1, -245 (1994)).
254. See Act of May 14, 1973, ch. 476, 1973 N.C. Sess. Laws 576 (codified at N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 143B-1, -324.3 (1997)).
255. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 143A-4 (1994), 143B4 (1997).
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administrative powers, duties, and functions in separate principal
offices or departments. 6 These offices and departments included the
Office of the Governor, eight departments separately headed by
other elected constitutional officers, and the other statutory
departments, which soon numbered nine. 7  Except for the eight
functional departments headed by elected constitutional officers, the
heads of the other nine functional departments are "appointed by the
Governor and serve at his pleasure."'"5
Soon after adoption of the Constitution of 1971 and those initial
executive organization acts, the General Assembly began asserting
oversight of the executive branch during the term of Governor James
E. Holshouser, Jr., a Republican elected in 1972.2" That legislative
oversight continued into the succeeding two terms of Governor James
B. Hunt, Jr., a Democrat first elected in 1976.21 Some of that
legislative oversight violated the doctrine of separation of powers, as
established in Wallace v. Bone261 and Advisory Opinion in re
Separation of Powers.262 Under those opinions, both written during
Governor Hunt's tenure, the General Assembly cannot
constitutionally encroach upon the governor's duty to prepare and
recommend a budget for legislative enactment. 63 Moreover, as the
constitution provides, the "budget as enacted by the General
Assembly shall be administered by the Governor."2
Stronger challenges to the governor's executive power and
tougher tests of the separation-of-powers doctrine awaited the
256. See id, §§ 143A-11 (Cum. Supp. 1998), 143B-6 (1997).
257. See id. §§ 143A-11 (Cum. Supp. 1998), 143B-6 (1997).
258. Ia- § 143B-9 (1997).
259. See RAN COBLE, SPECIAL PROvIsIONS IN BUDGET BILLS: A PANDORA'S Box
FOR NORTH CAROLINA CITIZENS 3, 5 (1986); Jack Betts, The Coming of Age of the N.C.
General Assembly, 4 N.C. INSIGHT, Dec. 1981, at 13, 15-16; Heath, supra note 202, at 19-
23.
260. See COBLE, supra note 259, at 5; Betts, supra note 259, at 15-16; Heath, supra note
202, at 19-23.
261. See supra notes 204-05 and accompanying text.
262. See supra note 203 and accompanying text.
263. The General Assembly created the Advisory Budget Commission in 1925. See
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-1 (1999). Separation-of-powers questions about the commission's
functions, with its members including those of the General Assembly, were raised in 1980,
at which time it continued to take direct action on budget requests; beginning in 1982, the
commission began to make recommendations to the governor regarding budget requests.
See Orth, supra note 202, at 38-43. See also MERCER DOTY, THE ADVISORY BUDGET
COMMISSION: NOT AS SIMPLE AS ABC, 44-47 (1980) (discussing the constitutional issues
surrounding the commission).
264. N.C. CONST. art. III, § 5(3); Advisory Opinion in re Separation of Powers, 305
N.C. at 776,295 S.E.2d at 594.
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election of Governor Hunt's successor, Governor Martin, a
Republican first elected in 1984. During his two terms, Governor
Martin was involved in several significant cases.265 The first of two
such cases discussed in this Part, Martin v. Thornburg,266 involved a
conflict between the Governor and the Attorney General over the
action of one of the Governor's appointed department heads. The
second, Martin v. Melott, summarized above,267 addressed the
governor's power to appoint statutory officers. A third case, Stott v.
Martin,m addressing the governor's ability to discharge certain state
employees and replace them, is discussed in Part V.2
As Governor Hunt explained in the context of Stott v. Martin,
the governor's ability to effect any of his agenda depends largely on
his ability to appoint and remove key subordinates: "When a
governor first comes in, he's got to put his team into place quickly in
order to get control of the government and be able to carry out the
mandate that the people have given to do their will."7  Because a
newly elected governor takes office in January, just before the
General Assembly convenes, he must promptly prepare a budget,
which may differ from the preceding governor's proposed budget, for
proposal to the General Assembly.27'As Governor Hunt added,
"[Y]ou've really got to get in and hit the ground running... [and] put
your team in immediately." 27 The governor's team must loyally
represent him not only with the public, but also with members of the
General Assembly and other government personnel.2 73 Thus, to
implement policies through the large state-government bureaucracy,
the governor needs a level of employees exempt from civil service
protection.274 It was "essential," in Governor Hunt's view, to have
265. See Coble, supra note 19, at 687-88.
266. 320 N.C. 533,359 S.E.2d 472 (1987).
267. See supra text accompanying notes 207-41.
268. 725 F. Supp. 1365 (E.D.N.C. 1989) ("Stott I"), rev'd sub nom. Stott v. Haworth,
916 F.2d 134 (4th Cir. 1990) ("Stott II"), on remand, Stott v. Martin, 783 F. Supp. 970
(E.D.N.C. 1992) ("Stott II").
269. See infra notes 328-62 and accompanying text.
270. Deposition of James B. Hunt, Jr., at 23-24, Stott 1, 725 F. Supp. 1365 (No. 85-818-
CIV-5). The district court paraphrased Governor Hunt's testimony as follows: "[T]here
are at least four qualifications those key people must have. They must be loyal to the
governor, responsive to his suggestions, effective in carrying out their duties, and
committed to his program." Stott I, 725 F. Supp. at 1385.
271. Deposition of James B. Hunt, Jr., supra note 270, at 23.
272. Id. at 23-24.
273. Id. at 75, 82.
274. Id. at 78-81. At the time of Governor Hunt's testimony, the state had
approximately 46,000 rank-and-file employees, and he had concluded that approximately
1500 should be designated as exempt. See id.
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subordinates exempt from civil service protection, "so that the policy-
making done by those exempt employees would be effective in
guiding and leading the rank and file state employees who were not
exempt."' To be an effective governor, Governor Hunt advised that
the governor "bring in new people that you know are loyal or
determine that others who may be in are loyal. You have to be
absolutely satisfied that you've got a team in there to do the job."276
B. The Governor, the Attorney General, and the Council of State
In 1985, Governor Hunt's newly elected successor, Governor
Martin, and his appointee to head the Department of Administration
proposed an administrative action requiring approval of the Council
of State. The Governor soon confronted opposition by the Attorney
General and the other elected members of the Council of State,
resulting in Martin v. Thornburg7 7 In Thornburg, the Governor and
his appointee commenced a declaratory judgment action against the
Attorney General and other members of the Council of State to
determine their respective rights and duties in connection with civil
actions against the state and regarding the administrative action at
issue, which involved leases executed on behalf of the state.2 78 A state
agency had leased certain office space, and, upon expiration of that
lease, the Department of Administration, statutorily responsible for
state leases subject to approval "of the Governor and Council of
State,"' 79 recommended leasing other office space for the agency.1°
At a meeting of the Council, the Attorney General moved for, and
the Council, in the absence of the Governor, unanimously approved
the state's renegotiating a proposed lease for the former office
space. 1 At a subsequent meeting of the Council, the Governor
asserted that under the applicable statutes the Council was to approve
or disapprove the Department's lease recommendation.' In the
Governor's opinion, the Council could not initiate a new lease
transaction or direct the Department to undertake one, and both the
Governor and the Council must approve a department lease
recommendation.8 The Governor also announced that he did not
275. Id
276. Id. at 80, 82, 87. See Beyle, supra note 55, at 33-37.
277. 320 N.C. 533, 359 S.E.2d 472 (1987).
278. See id at 535, 359 S.E.2d at 473.
279. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 143-341(4)(d) (1999), 146-22 (Cum. Supp. 1998).
280. See Thornburg, 320 N.C. at 536,359 S.E.2d at 473.
281. See id. at 536, 359 S.E.2d at 473.
282. See id at 537, 359 S.E.2d at 475.
283. See id
1999] 2087
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
approve the proposal for the former office space or any negotiation
for its lease. 4 Before the Governor and the Council could resolve
their differences, the owner of the former office space commenced a
civil action against the state alleging award of a contract for the office
space; the Attorney General unilaterally appeared for the state in
that action. 2 5 The Governor and his appointee then commenced
their separate declaratory judgment action, resolved on appeal to the
North Carolina Supreme Court in Martin v. Thornburg. 6 The appeal
presented nine issues, but the court decided only three, declining to
decide the others it described as "grave constitutional and statutory
questions which may arise in the event of continued differences
between the various executive officers of the State."'
First, based on statutory interpretation and analogous authority,
Thornburg held that no statute authorized the Council of State to
require the Department of Administration to negotiate and enter into
any lease other than the lease proposed by the Department to the
Council for statutory approval.' Second, the court held that because
the Department had presented the "lowest rental proposed" under
the applicable statutory criteria, the Council's authority was limited to
either approving or disapproving that proposal and that the Council's
"further action" of directing the Department to negotiate and enter
into a lease for the former office space "was therefore without
statutory authorization."' 9 Third, also on statutory grounds only, the
court held that the Governor, represented by private counsel in the
action, need not have the prior advice of the Attorney General to
employ special counsel to represent the state and that the applicable
statute "gives the Governor the unrestricted right to 'employ such
special counsel as he may deem proper or necessary.' "1290
Yielding only unsurprising statutory interpretations, Thornburg
left open underlying constitutional questions about the Council
collectively2 91 and the Attorney General individually. Because of the
284. See id at 537, 359 S.E.2d at 474-75.
285. See id. at 538, 359 S.E.2d at 475.
286. See id. at 535, 359 S.E.2d at 473.
287. Id. at 548,359 S.E.2d at 480-81.
288. Id. at 541, 359 S.E.2d at 476-77.
289. Id. at 545, 359 S.E.2d at 479. But cf. Frye Reg. Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Hunt, 350 N.C.
39, 46-47, 510 S.E.2d 159, 164 (1999) (holding that the governor's statutory power to
approve an agency's statutorily mandated plan includes the power to amend the plan).
290. Thornburg, 320 N.C. at 548, 359 S.E.2d at 480 (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 147-
17(a) (1993)).
291. See id. at 548, 359 S.E.2d at 480-81 (noting the Thornburg court's declination to
address the underlying constitutional questions in the case).
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Governor's statutory right to employ special counsel to represent the
state, the supreme court did not consider the Governor's argument
that such authority arises constitutionally from the executive power?
92
It did, however, consider whether the Attorney General's statutory
duty to appear for the state in any proceeding in which it is a party
violates the constitutional provision that "the executive power of the
State shall be vested in the Governor."2 93 The court noted that the
constitution does not prescribe the duties of the attorney general and
that the statutorily prescribed duties include appearing for the state in
actions and the common law power to prosecute actions for the
state.294  Although it either ignored or overlooked its earlier
precedent for the attorney general's commencing an action based
upon a legal determination by the governor,295 the court did cite a
then-recent court of appeals case illustrating the potential for conflict
between the governor and the attorney general2 96 The underlying
292- Id. at 548,359 S.E.2d at 480.
293. N.C. CONST. art. III, § 1.
294. See Thornburg, 320 N.C. at 545,359 S.E.2d at 479.
295. See State ex rel. Attorney General v. Knight, 169 N.C. 333, 85 S.E. 418 (1915). In
Knight, decided prior to women's suffrage, the Governor had appointed a woman to be a
notary public pursuant to a 1915 act authorizing him to appoint women as well as men to
be notaries and declaring the position of notary not to be an "office"; he declined to
appoint more than one woman until the courts determined the validity of the act. See id.
at 334, 85 S.E. at 418-19. The Governor apparently determined that the act was
unconstitutional and had the attorney general challenge it. The court agreed, holding that
the position was an "office" and that, because the appointed woman could not vote, she
could not hold the office. See id. at 353-54, 85 S.E. at 428. Of course, more recent
precedent establishes that the governor himself has standing in a declaratory judgment
action regarding statutes. See State ex reL Hunt v. North Carolina Reinsurance Facility,
302 N.C. 274, 280-81, 275 S.E.2d 399, 400-01 (1981) (where both the Governor and
commissioner of insurance were represented by the attorney general).
296. See Thornburg, 320 N.C. at 546, 359 S.E.2d at 480, citing Tice v. Department of
Transp., 67 N.C. App. 48, 312 S.E.2d 241 (1984). In Tice, a case in which the attorney
general was defending the department of transportation, the court of appeals held that the
attorney general could not enter into a consent judgment with the plaintiff without the
approval of the executive-department client. See id. at 49, 312 S.E.2d at 242. While
recognizing that the attorney general has control in actions and appeals prosecuted for the
state by him, citing State v. Thompson, 10 N.C. (3 Hawks) 613 (1825), the court concluded
that when the attorney general was defending a state executive department headed by an
appointee of the governor, the traditional attorney-client rule applied and that the client
controlled the attorney general's action. See Tice, 67 N.C. App. at 51, 53-55, 312 S.E.2d at
243, 244-45. In supporting its conclusion, the court stated:
The Governor is a constitutional officer elected by the qualified voters of the
State. The executive power of the State is vested in him; and he has the duty to
supervise the official conduct of all executive officers. The Attorney General is a
constitutional officer elected independently of the Governor; is the head of the
Department of Justice; and has the duty to supervise that Department's
activities. The constitutional independence of these offices, and their differing
functions and duties, create clear potential for conflict between their respective
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issue is, of course, whether the governor or the attorney general
determines the state's policy position in civil actions."9 In Thornburg,
the court stated without further explanation: "The independent
executive offices of Governor and Attorney General with their
differing functions and duties under the constitution create a clear
potential for conflict. '298 In that case, however, the court found no
such conflict because "the duty of the Attorney General to appear for
and defend the State or its agencies in actions in which the State may
be a party or interested is not in derogation of or inconsistent with the
executive power vested by the constitution in the Governor. '299
Whatever the potential meaning of those statements, their immediate
import is clear: The court will resolve such conflicts on a case-by-case
basis.
C. The Governor's Power to Appoint Officers
Such a "potential for conflict" as recognized in Thornburg300 had
also arisen in Martin v. Melott,301 decided the same day as Thornburg.
In Melott, the Attorney General opposed the Governor's contentions
that certain statutory appointment provisions were
unconstitutional.m The Attorney General prevailed, and Governor
Martin's challenge under the constitutional appointments clause of
statutory provisions for non-gubernatorial appointment of a statutory
officer received no judicial support. The Melott three-justice plurality
holders. In the event of such conflict, power in the Attorney General to resolve,
without their consent, controversies involving agencies or departments under the
supervision of the Governor, could be abused by exercise in a manner effectively
derogative of the Governor's constitutional duties to exercise executive power
and to supervise the official conduct of all executive officers.
Tice, 67 N.C. App. at 55, 312 S.E.2d at 245 (Whichard, J.) (citations omitted). Judge
Whichard later became a North Carolina Supreme Court justice.
297. See, e.g., Republican Party of N.C. v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943, 946-47 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 510 U.S. 828 (1993), on remand, 841 F. Supp. 722 (E.D.N.C. 1994), aff'd, 27 F.3d
563 (4th Cir. 1994) (unpublished opinion) (involving constitutional challenge to statewide
election of superior court judges). For a recent example of potential conflict between the
governor and the attorney general, see HOUSE SELEcr COMMITTEE FOR PERSONNEL
REVEW REPORT, 1998 Sess. (N.C. 1998). That legislative committee found that the
Governor's office entered into a $100,000 settlement-payment agreement with a state
employee "with virtually no oversight by the Attorney General's office." Id at 3-4. The
committee recommended that the Governor's office not involve itself in legal settlements
with any state employee not employed in the Governor's office absent a request from the
attorney general. Id. at 8.
298. Thornburg, 320 N.C. at 546,359 S.E.2d at 480.
299. Id
300. Id.
301. 320 N.C. 518,359 S.E.2d 783 (1987) (plurality opinion).
302. See id at 519-20,359 S.E.2d at 785 (plurality opinion).
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opinion,30 3 the two-justice concurring opinion,314 and the single-justice
dissenting opinion all rejected the Governor's appointments clause
challenge.3 05
The 1971 appointments clause provides, "The Governor shall
nominate and by and with the advice and consent of a majority of the
Senators appoint all officers whose appointments are not otherwise
provided for. '36 Each word and phrase in the clause had settled
judicial construction,3 7 and the phrase "not otherwise provided for"
always "meant unless provided for by the Constitution itself. '308 The
original 1868 clause redundantly added after "all officers" two
phrases, "whose offices are established by this Constitution, or which
shall be created by law. '309 The 1875 amendments, discussed above,
310
had eliminated the phrase "or which shall be created by law," or
statutory officers, restricting "all officers" subject to the clause to
those "whose offices are established by this Constitution," or
constitutional officers.3 ' Under the 1875 amendments to the
appointments clause, the legislature again constitutionally controlled
the filling of offices created by statute, as it had done before 1868. As
explained by the supreme court in its last appointments case under
that clause before adoption of the Constitution of 1971, all statutory
officers were to be appointed as provided by the legislature.31 The
drafters of the 1971 appointments clause realized that the prior clause
had been emasculated by the 1875 amendments and had become
meaningless because no constitutional officers existed whose
303. See id. at 520, 359 S.E.2d at 785 (plurality opinion). Justice Webb wrote the
opinion and was joined by Justices Frye and Mitchell. See id. at 518, 520, 359 S.E.2d at
784-85.
304. See id. at 524,359 S.E.2d at 787 (Meyer, J., concurring in result). Justice Whichard
joined in the opinion. See id at 518, 359 S.E.2d at 784.
305. See id at 528,359 S.E.2d at 789 (Martin, J., dissenting).
306. N.C. CONST. art. III, § 5(8).
307. See Melot, 320 N.C. at 520-21, 359 S.E.2d at 785 (plurality opinion) (citing State
ex rel. Salisbury v. Croom, 167 N.C. 223, 83 S.E. 354 (1914); Ewart v. Jones, 116 N.C. 570,
21 S.E. 787 (1895); and People ex rel. Cloud v. Wilson, 72 N.C. 155 (1875)). The Melott
plurality did not find those prior interpretations binding. See Melot, 320 N.C. at 521, 359
S.E.2d at 785 (plurality opinion).
308. Croom, 167 N.C. at 226, 83 S.E. at 355. The Melott plurality did not find that prior
interpretation binding. See Melott, 320 N.C. at 521, 359 S.E.2d at 785 (plurality opinion).
309. See id. at 521, 359 S.E.2d at 786 (plurality opinion).
310. See supra text accompanying notes 63-70.
311. Melott, 320 N.C. at 521-22,359 S.E.2d at 785-86 (plurality opinion).
312. Croom, 167 N.C. at 226, 83 S.E. at 355 (involving directorates of central state
hospital; dispute between an appointee of a former governor and an appointee of a
successor governor) (quoting State ex. reL Cherry v. Burns, 124 N.C. 761, 761, 33 S.E. 136,
136 (1899)).
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appointments were not otherwise provided for in the constitution.3
In their drafting, the authors first deleted the prior meaningless clause
altogether, but then redrafted it by simply striking the phrase that
formerly restricted "all officers" to constitutional officers. 14
Based on that history and precedents for constitutional
interpretation, Governor Martin contended that the new 1971
appointments clause applied to the appointment of statutory officers
whose appointments are not otherwise provided for in the
constitution. 15 He argued that only the governor, with the advice and
consent of the Senate under the appointments clause, could appoint
the new director of the new statutorily created state agency. 16
The three-justice plurality glossed over the clause's convoluted
history317 and dismissed prior judicial construction of the controlling
phrase "whose appointments are not otherwise provided for" as
dictum or distinguishable.318  The plurality ignored the early
explanation of a justice who had been a delegate to the constitutional
convention that first applied the language in North Carolina and who
was an authority on the constitution: "To read the words as applying
to the act of Assembly creating the office, would make them
useless. '31  Instead, the plurality concluded, "We cannot say that the
313. See Record on Appeal, Tr. 149-54, 168-71, Melott (No. 61PA87) (discussing
Plaintiff's Exhibits 26,28, and 29A).
314. See Record on Appeal, Tr. 92-113, Melott (No. 61PA87) (discussing Plaintiff's
Exhibits 26, 28, 30, 31 and 38).
315. See Melott, 320 N.C. at 520-21,359 S.E.2d at 77-85 (plurality opinion).
316. See id. at 520-21, 359 S.E.2d at 785 (plurality opinion).
317. A composite history of the appointments clause is described below. The full text
of the original clause in the Constitution of 1868, article III, section 10, is shown. Brackets
set out the text deleted by the 1875 amendments. Parentheses set out the text deleted by
the 1971 "revision and amendment." The italicized text is the resulting Constitution of
1971, article III, section 5(8):
Appointments. The Governor shall nominate (,) and by and with the advice
and consent of a majority of the Senators (elect,) appoint [,] all officers (whose
offices are established by this Constitution,) [or which shall be created by law,]
(and) whose appointments are not otherwise provided for [, and no such officer
shall be appointed or elected by the General Assembly].
N.C. CONsT. of 1971, art. III, § 5(8); N.C. CONST. of 1868, art. III, § 10 (amended 1875);
N.C. CONST. of 1868, art. III, § 10.
31& See Melott, 320 N.C. at 520-21, 359 S.E.2d at 785 (plurality opinion). The plurality
acknowledged that "[t]here is language to this effect in these cases," id, (plurality opinion)
(referring to cases cited in supra note 307), but said "the language is not necessary to the
holding in any of them." Idt at 20,359 S.E.2d at 785 (plurality opinion).
319. Railroad v. Holden, 63 N.C. 410, 423 (1869) (Rodman, J.). See JOURNAL OF THE
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA AT ITS SESSION
1868, 483-84 (1868) (noting Justice Rodman's address to the North Carolina
Constitutional Convention of 1868 on the subject of the changes to the executive power).
The phrase "not otherwise provided for," used in the North Carolina Constitution of 1868,
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phrase 'whose appointments are not otherwise provided for' has such
a well settled judicial construction that we must use it in this case. "320
Thus, under the plurality opinion, the General Assembly could
provide otherwise by statute for the appointment of the statutory
officer at issue.32'
The plurality correctly noted that the revisers of the constitution
could have proposed adding to the phrase "otherwise provided for"
the restrictive phrase "in the Constitution." The plurality concluded
that because the revisers made no such proposal "it is only reasonable
to conclude they intended to increase the Governor's power from
making appointments of constitutional officers to all officers whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for."3' Obviously
confusing or obfuscating, that statement ignores the effect of the
plurality's illogical interpretation of the appointments clause,
expressed as the following fallacious syllogism: A, the 1875
appointments clause was meaningless; B, the revisers deleted the
meaningless clause in their draft and then re-drafted it into a new
clause; therefore C, the new amended clause as adopted is virtually
was used earlier by Madison, when it clearly meant "not otherwise provided for" in the
Federal Constitution. See JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787, 45-48, 120, 310 (Ohio U. Press ed. 1966). People ex rel. Nichols v.
McKee-reviewed the officers whose appointments were "otherwise provided for" in the
constitution of 1868. 68 N.C. at 430-38. "The true test is, Where does the Constitution
lodge the power of electing the various public agents of the government?" Trustees of the
Univ. of N.C. v. McIver, 72 N.C 76, 85 (1875) (addressing the election of university
trustees by the General Assembly pursuant to 1873 constitutional amendment). Under the
Constitution of 1971, appointments "otherwise provided for" are: members of the State
Board of Education (Art. IX, § 4(1): "members appointed by the Governor, subject to
confirmation by the General Assembly in joint session") (see also N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 115C-10 (1997) (describing appointment of the Board)); magistrates (Art. IV, § 10:
appointed by senior regular resident superior court judge from nomination submitted by
clerk of court); trustees of the University of North Carolina and other institutions of
higher education (Art. IX, § 8: the General Assembly shall provide for their selection);
officers of the Senate (Art. II, § 14(1): the Senate elects); officers of the House (Art. II,
§ 15: the House elects); officers of counties, cities, and towns (Art. VII, § 1: the General
Assembly shall provide). Elected officers are the governor (Art. III, § 2(1)), lieutenant
governor (id.), secretary of state (Art. III, § 7(1)), auditor (Id.), treasurer (id.),
superintendent of public instruction (id.), attorney general (id.), commissioner of
agriculture (id.), commissioner of labor (id.), commissioner of insurance (id.), justices of
the supreme court (Art. IV, § 16), judges of the court of appeals (id.), regular judges of
superior court (id.), clerk of superior court (Art. IV, § 9(3)), district attorneys (Art. IV,
§ 18(1)), and sheriffs (Art. VII, § 2).
320. Melott, 320 N.C. at 521, 359 S.E.2d at 785 (plurality opinion) (quoting N.C.
CONST. art. III, § 5(8)).
321. See id. at 521-22,359 S.E.2d at 785-86.
322- Id. at 522,359 S.E.2d at 785.
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meaningless.3'
The two-justice concurring opinion inexplicably failed to
interpret the appointments clause, but implicitly agreed with the
plurality's interpretation of it. 24  The lone dissenter, on the
separation-of-powers grounds discussed above, agreed with the
plurality regarding the appointments clause, but without elaboration.
On the meaning of the appointments clause, the dissenter was
satisfied with "a few preliminary observations," including a simple
formulation and a summary conclusion.32
Thus, six justices interpreted the appointments clause to mean, in
effect, that without an explicit constitutional provision to the
contrary, the General Assembly may provide for the appointment of
statutory officers, and only if it makes no statutory provision for the
appointment of a statutory officer does the governor's appointment
power under the appointments clause become effective. 6 Perhaps of
limited precedential effect, the Martin v. Melott opinions may be
323. See Record on Appeal, Tr. 92, 149-50, 168-70, Melott (No. 61PA87) (referencing
Plaintiff's Exhibit 26). A basic editorial rule of the Constitution Study Commission of
1968 was to omit "provisions that we deemed to be legislative in nature and therefore
inappropriate to the constitution." 1968 REPORT, supra note 100, at 29; see also Sanders,
supra note 122, at 91 (noting that the Commission omitted legislative provisions); Record
on Appeal, Tr. 125-27, Melott (No. 61PA87) (same). Contradicting those earlier writings,
their author later proffered an explanation that the new appointments clause "provided a
means for the filling of offices constitutionally or statutorily created for which no other
provision was made by Constitution or statute to fill." Record on Appeal, Tr. 153, Melott
(No. 61PA87) (stating the testimony of John L. Sanders). Of course, there are no such
constitutional offices, and should there be any such statutory offices, the new
appointments clause would be rendered merely "legislative in nature." Mr. Sanders had
apparently never considered the appointments clause to be noteworthy; in his articles on
constitutional history, he did not note it at all and apparently saw no significance in the
adoption of the clause in 1868 or in its amendment in 1875. See Sanders, supra note 70
(making no mention of the significance of the appointments clause); Sanders, supra note
122 (same); Record on Appeal, Tr. 161-62, Melott (No. 61PA87) (same). He apparently
once thought that after the 1875 amendments the appointments clause "was left
substantially intact." Sanders, supra note 70, at 796-97; REPORT, supra note 100, at 106
(noting that John L. Sanders thought the appointments clause was left intact after the 1875
amendments). At an early stage in the Constitution Study Commission's work in 1968,
when Mr. Sanders was assisting its subcommittee on the executive, Mr. Sanders
recommended no change in the former clause although that subcommittee's substantive
proposal was inconsistent with it and although Mr. Sanders says that he then knew that the
former clause was meaningless. See Record on Appeal, Tr. 150, 167-68, Melott (No.
61PA87) (referencing Plaintiff's Exhibit 18). In fairness to Mr. Sanders, it is noted that
only one earlier historian of the era of adoption of the original appointments clause noted
the clause, and he noted only that "[a]ll nominations of the governor had to be confirmed
by the Senate." HAMILTON, supra note 47, at 249 (1906).
324. See Melott, 320 N.C. at 524, 359 S.E.2d at 787 (Meyer, J., concurring in result).
325. See id. at 528-29, 533, 359 S.E.2d at 789, 792 (Martin, J., dissenting).
326. See supra note 323.
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distinguished or disowned should another appointment challenge
arise under different circumstances and confront the court with a new
opportunity to give the appointments clause its plain meaning.327 As a
result of Martin v. Melott, however, the appointments clause now lies
dormant, virtually meaningless, and the General Assembly, not the
governor, constitutionally controls the appointment of state statutory
officers.
IV. EXECUTIVE HIRING AND FIRING OF EMPLOYEES
A. The Governor's Selection of Other Subordinates
As the Governor was losing the state battle for the power to
appoint executive officers at the top of the state bureaucracy, three
former state employees challenged, on federal constitutional grounds
in federal district court, the governor's ability to influence the
bureaucracy at lower levels. The three former employees had been
exempt from protection under the State Personnel Act as holders of
"policymaking positions" as designated earlier by Governor Hunt
and, thus, were employees at willi 2. They were dismissed early after
Governor Martin's 1985 incumbency, and they each filed civil actions
against the Governor and the appointed department heads who had
dismissed them.329  In Stott v. Martin the three actions were
consolidated, six other department heads appointed by the Governor
were joined as defendants, and the proceedings were certified as a
class action on behalf of approximately 130 other former employees
dismissed in the Martin administration.30 The class action became a
political cause celebre.33'
The former employees alleged that they were discharged because
of their political party affiliation and political activities, in violation of
327. See Coble, supra note 19, at 687 (noting that "Melott's importance may be
diminished somewhat, since it is only a plurality decision and it has been criticized as
inconsistent with previous separation of powers decisions"); see also Winfree, supra note
207, at 1117 (criticizing Melott); Devlin, supra note 19, at 1246 & nn.141-44 (criticizing
Melou).
328. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 126-1, 126-5 (1999).
329. See Stott v. Martin, No. 85-818-CIV-5 (E.D.N.C. 1985); Register v. Martin, No. 86-
650-CIV-5 (E.D.N.C. 1986); Cayton v. Martin, No. 86-683-CIV-5 (E.D.N.C. 1986).
330. See Stott 1, 725 F. Supp. 1365, 1380-81 (E.D.N.C 1989); see also Martin H.
Brindey, Note, Despoiling the Spoils: Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, 69 N.C. L.
REV. 719, 737-39 (1991) (discussing Stott 1).,
331. See Beyle, supra note 55, at 34 (noting that the Stott I was "a pivotal case with
considerable national interest because it is the first case to directly challenge a governor's
power of removal").
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their First Amendment rights, and premised their claims on the
United States Supreme Court's Elrod v. Burns 3 2 and Branti v.
FinkeP33 decisions. Elrod repudiated patronage-style discharges
based solely on political party affiliation of certain lower-level public
employees, concluding that the employees were protected from such
discharges by the First Amendment.' The Court recognized,
however, that for a state government to be responsive to the needs of
the people, the elected officials and their higher-level appointees
must have some subordinates also responsive to their political
mandates and, therefore, not constitutionally protected from
discharge because of political affiliation.335  For such unprotected
subordinates, Elrod stated the determinative standards to be the
confidential or policy-making nature of the subordinates' positions,
but Branti subsequently expounded a justification of political
affiliation for such subordinates where "party affiliation is an
appropriate requirement for the effective performance of the public
office involved. '336 Under those "skeletal teachings," a considerable
body of case law had been decided.337
The district court in Stott v. Martin, after class certification, ruled
on motions for summary judgment and (1) dismissed the claims of
fifty-five class members, (2) left sixty-three pending of which it
concluded forty-six were protected from discharge for political
reasons, and (3) deferred ruling on others. On interlocutory
appeal, the Fourth Circuit invalidated the class certification,339 and on
remand the district court dismissed the three initial claims on the
merits, thereby ending the proceedings 0
332. 427 U.S. 347 (1976) (plurality opinion) (holding it unconstitutional to discharge
deputy sheriffs because of their political party affiliation).
333. 445 U.S. 507 (1980) (holding it unconstitutional to discharge assistant public
defenders because of their political party affiliation). For a survey of subsequent lower-
court cases, see generally Susan Lorde Martin, A Decade of Branti Decisions: A
Government Official's Guide to Patronage Dismissals, 39 AM. U. L. REv. 11 (1989). For
subsequent Supreme Court Elrod-Branti political affiliation decisions, see generally Rutan
v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62 (1990) (extending the Elrod-Branti principles from
discharge cases to hiring and promotion cases), and O'Hare Truck Serv., Inc. v. City of
Northlake, 518 U.S. 712 (1996) (extending the Elrod-Branti principles from employees to
independent contractors).
334. See Elrod, 427 U.S. at 350-51, 372-73.
335. See id at 367-68, 372.
336. Branti, 445 U.S. at 518.
337. Jimenez Fuentes v. Torres Gatzambide, 807 F.2d 236, 240 (1st Cir. 1986) (en
banc).
33& Stott , 725 F. Supp. 1365, 1387-1437 (E.D.N.C. 1989).
339. Stott 11, 916 F.2d 134, 143-46 (4th Cir. 1990).
340. Stott 111, 783 F. Supp. 970, 993 (E.D.N.C. 1992).
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Although the issues in Stott were matters of federal law, the
claims arose from state action under the State Personnel Act.'l The
Act permitted the Governor to designate as exempt from civil service
protection employees within his office and a limited number of
employees in each of the nine departments headed by his
appointees. 42 Governor Hunt had designated approximately 1500
state employees as exempt under the Act. 43 His successor, Governor
Martin, established a primary goal of reducing the number of exempt
positions.3
4
Nevertheless, Governor Martin was a Republican following a
Democrat, and department secretaries appointed by Governor
Martin discharged some exempt employees left over from the Hunt
administration. The district court had "found that the central issue in
this case was whether the Martin administration engaged in a policy
and practice of firing state government employees solely because of
their political affiliation or activities." 5  The Fourth Circuit
concluded, however, that in Elrod-Branti claims the "mere allegation
of political patronage dismissal falls short of stating a cause of action
capable of class treatment. The inquiry must focus on the claim of the
individual." 6
For an Elrod-Branti inquiry, which requires difficult scrutiny,' 47
the Fourth Circuit adopted a two-part test formulated by the First
Circuit in its numerous decisions arising from the 1984 elections. The
initial-inquiry, derived from Branti, examines "whether the position at
issue, no matter how policy-influencing or confidential it may be,
relates to 'partisan political interests ... [or] concerns.' "m Then, if
341. See Stott I, 725 F. Supp. at 1380 (noting North Carolina's Personnel Act); see also
Jenkins v. Medford, 119 F.3d 1156, 1162-64 (4th Cir. 1997) (en banc), cert. denied, 118 S.
Ct. 881 (1998) (noting that the statutory provisions mirror the constitutional standards).
342. See Stott I, 916 F.2d at 136-37, 142-43.
343. Id. at 137 n.2.
344. See id. at 138-39. The Fourth Circuit noted:
Before us is a situation where Governor Martin was attempting to bring the
North Carolina employment scheme into conformity with the civil employee
statute by cutting down on the number of exempt positions extant in North
Carolina. Unfortunately, Governor Martin was faced with the task of trimming
exempt positions that under the statute most likely should never have been so
designated. This we find to be bipartisan decision and not a decision based on
the governor's affiliation to the Republican party.
Id. at 142 n.11.
345. Id. at 138.
346. Id. at 141.
347. See id.
348. Id. at 141-42 (quoting Jimenez Fuentes v. Torres Gaztambide, 807 F.2d 236, 241-
42 (1st Cir. 1986) (en banc)).
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partisan political interests are implicated by the position, the court
must examine the position's particular responsibilities "to determine
whether it resembles a policymaker, a privy to confidential
information, a communicator, or some other office holder whose
function is such that party affiliation is an equally appropriate
requirement. " 349  The Fourth Circuit reviewed numerous cases
holding that employees in certain positions, such as a confidential
secretary or attorney, are subject to removal based on political
affiliation, as well as other cases holding that certain employees, such
as road graders and bookkeepers, are not.350 Those cases set the
parameters for the district court in its individual inquiries on
remand.3
In reaching its decision, the Fourth Circuit recognized the
importance of "political patronage as an accepted and necessary
practice in democratic governance."352 Agreeing that there can be
"'a rational connection between shared ideology and job
performance,'" which "'would exempt from protection most
policymaking, and confidential employees,' ,353 the Fourth Circuit
concluded that the Supreme Court had affirmed, in its subsequent
Rutan decision, "the Elrod-Branti principle that 'a government's
interest in securing employees who will loyally implement its policies
can be adequately served by choosing or dismissing certain high level
employees on the basis of their political views.' ,134 Concluding that
Stott exemplified that interpretation, the Fourth Circuit found in the
statutory provisions for exemption from civil service protection
presumptions of exceptions from Elrod-Branti protection and a
rationale for allowing "the governor to employ top level state
employees on an at-will basis, and to reposition these employees as he
felt necessary in order to further the agenda of the administration.
'355
For the Fourth Circuit, an Elrod-Branti determination "is whether a
particular position is one that requires, as a qualification for its
performance, political affiliation. If it does, then dismissal or
demotion is within the bounds of the Constitution.
'356
Stott remains controlling authority in the Fourth Circuit, as
349. Id. at 142 (quotingJimenez Fuentes, 807 F.2d at 240).
350. See id. at 144-45.
351. See Stott 11I, 783 F. Supp. 970, 993 (E.D.N.C. 1992).
352. Stott II, 916 F.2d at 141 (citing Ecker v. Cohalan, 542 F. Supp. 896, 903 (E.D.N.Y.
1982)).
353. Id at 142 (quoting Savage v. Gorski, 850 F.2d 64, 68 (2d Cir. 1988)).
354. IM at 142 (quoting Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62,74 (1990)).
355. Id at 142.
356. Id. at 143.
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emphasized recently in Jenkins v. Medford.357 Although Jenkins did
not involve gubernatorial patronage, the court's decision that a newly
elected sheriff may lawfully dismiss deputy sheriffs who supported his
opponent in the election emphasized electoral politics. As the
Jenkins court explained, "[T]he triumph of one candidate indicates
voter approval of the candidate's espoused platform and general
agreement with the candidate's 'expressed political agenda.' "358 In
such situations, certainly applicable in gubernatorial elections, party
affiliation or campaign activity "serves as a proxy for loyalty.
359
Noting that Branti itself recognized that party affiliation may be a
proxy for loyalty and stating that Stott refined the Elrod-Branti
inquiry, the Fourth Circuit observed that a governor may
appropriately conclude that assistants such as speechwriters and
communicators with the press and legislature should share his
political beliefs and party affiliation 3O Thus, in Fourth Circuit
patronage cases, courts are to apply a Stott-type analysis to the
specific position at issue to determine whether loyalty or its proxy,
political party affiliation, "is an appropriate requirement for the
job."'361 As Branti cautioned, however, "the ultimate inquiry is not
whether the label 'policymaker' or 'confidential' fits a particular
position; rather, the question is whether the hiring authority can
demonstrate that party affiliation is an appropriate requirement for
the effective performance of the public office involved."362
B. The Governor's Selection of Subordinates and the Courts
As Stott v. Martin illustrates, the governor's selection of
subordinates, as well as state personnel policies and practices, are
affected by certain federal laws, including the civil rights act
prohibiting deprivation of citizens' rights under color of state law? 63
That act applies to the governor and other state executive officers,
and they may be subject to prospective injunctive relief against
violating those laws in appropriate circumstances. 364 Federal civil
357. 119 F.3d 1156 (4th Cir. 1997) (en banc), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 881 (1998).
35& Id. at 1162 (quoting Upton v. Thompson, 930 F.2d 1209, 1215 (7th Cir. 1991)).
359. Id at 1164 & n.62.
360. See id. at 1164 n.62 (quoting Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 518 (1980)).
361. Id. at 1164.
362. O'Hare Truck Serv., Inc. v. City of Northlake, 518 U.S. 712, 719 (1996) (quoting
Branti, 445 U.S. at 518).
363. See Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13, 13-15 (1887) (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (1994)).
364. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159,161-71 (1985) (involving a civil suit against
a state official in his personal capacity stemming from a warrantless search); Ex Parte
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rights claims can subject the governor to discovery, potential personal
liability for damages, and prospective injunctive relief in his official
capacity. As a result, the governor's hiring and firing of subordinates
may be subject to scrutiny and control by federal courts.
In Stott, the district court subjected Governor Martin's personnel
policies and practices to discovery, and the Governor was deposed
before the district judge pursuant to a protective order 65 Amid some
controversy, other discovery occurred in the case but with no formal
delineation of the scope of potential discovery of the state's.
executive.366 Subsequently, in Republican Party of North Carolina v.
Martin,367 the district court established that potential discovery of the
governor is indeed broad.3" Republican Party involved a challenge to
the constitutionality of a statute369 that Governor Martin had
advocated amending. 7 Although the Governor was only a nominal
party in the action,371 another party served him with a subpoena that
commanded him to appear at a deposition and to bring all documents
related to the statute and to the plaintiffs' contention that it was
unconstitutional.3 7 2 Governor Martin moved to quash the subpoena
and sought a protective orderY.37  Although recognizing that a
governor should not be" compelled to testify at a deposition absent a
clear showing that the discovery is essential to prevent prejudice or
injustice to the party requesting it, the court found that "[f]airness
dictates that [the other party] be allowed to depose Governor Martin
with regard to his prospective testimony. 3 74 Thus, the court denied
Young, 209 U.S. 123, 126-204 (1908) (addressing the Attorney General's being held in
contempt for violating state laws); see also Corum v. University of N.C., 330 N.C. 761, 789,
413 S.E.2d 276, 293-94 (1992) (barring claims against state officials in their personal
capacity when only monetary damages are sought).
365. See Stott 1, 725 F. Supp. 1365 (E.D.N.C. 1989) (order dated May 14,1987).
366. See id.
367. 136 F.R.D. 421 (E.D.N.C. 1991), decided on appeal on other grounds, 980 F.2d 943
(4th Cir. 1992).
36& See Republican Party of N.C., No. 88-263-CIV-5-F, at 23 (E.D.N.C. Jan. 18, 1991)
(order demanding compliance with subpoena); Republican Party of N.C., No. 88-263-CIV-
5-F, at 4-5 (E.D.N.C. Nov. 1990) (order denying a motion for protective order and holding
in abeyance a motion to quash subpoena).
369. See Republican Party of N.C., 980 F.2d at 946-48.
370. See I ADDRESSES AND PUBLIC PAPERS OF GOVERNOR JAMES G. MARTIN 35-36
(1992).
371. See Republican Party of N. C., 980 F.2d at 946 n.2.
372. See Subpoena Duces Tecum, Republican Party of N.C., No. 88-263-CIV-5-F
(E.D.N.C. Mar. 14,1990).
373. See Motion to Quash Subpoena Pursuant to Rule 45(b) and for Protective Order
Pursuant to Rule 26(c) at 4-5, Republican Party of N.C., No. 88-263-CIV-5 (E.D.N.C. Mar.
14,1990).
374. Republican Party of N. C., No. 88-263-CIV-5-F, at 3-4 (E.D.N.C. Nov. 1990) (order
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the motion for a protective order and allowed the deposition, subject
to specified procedures, including that it be held before the presiding
district judge.3 75 The court ordered that the motion to quash be held
in abeyance pending examination of the documents in camera. It
ordered that the documents be delivered to the court under seal,
along with briefs discussing the privilege being claimed. 76 The
Governor complied, waiving any claim of executive privilege, but
continuing to claim that some documents were protected by the
attorney-client privilege and the work-product doctrine. After in
camera examination, the court disposed of the remaining claims.377
denying a motion for protective order and holding in abeyance a motion to quash
subpoena). The court cited only one case, Monti v. State, 563 A.2d 629, 631 (Vt. 1989), for
the proposition. See Republican Party of N.C., 88-263-CIV-5-F, at 3; see also United States
v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 421-22 (1941) (protecting the Secretary of Agriculture from
testifying about his exercise of discretion); Sweeney v. Bond, 669 F.2d 542, 546 (8th Cir.
1982) (upholding the district court's requirement that the discovering party show "specific
need" for a deposition of a state governor); Halperin v. Kissinger, 606 F.2d 1192, 1209-10
n.120 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (stating that where a showing of need prevails over a broad claim of
privilege, the district court might require that discovery first be made of subordinates
before sanctioning discovery that imposes on the time of high-level officials such as the
secretary of state), affd, 452 U.S. 713 (1981). As the Supreme Court recently noted in
denying temporary immunity for the President in a civil action arising out of alleged
unofficial acts while he was a state governor prior to his presidency, "[slitting Presidents
have responded to court orders to provide testimony and other information with sufficient
frequency that such interactions between the Judicial and Executive Branches can scarcely
be thought a novelty." Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 704-05 (1997) (describing
presidential responses by written interrogatories, tapes, depositions, and videotaped
testimony). The district court has "broad discretion," and "potential burdens ... are
appropriate matters for the District Court to evaluate in its management of the case. The
high respect that is owed to the office of the Chief Executive ... is a matter that should
inform the conduct of the entire proceeding, including the timing and scope of discovery."
Id. at 706-07.
375. See Republican Party of N.C., No. 88-263-CIV-5, at 4-5 (E.D.N.C. Nov. 7, 1990)
(order denying a motion for protective order and holding in abeyance a motion to quash
subpoena).
376. See id. at 5-6. The court added: "As to those documents for which executive
privilege is claimed, the executive decision to which they relate and the date thereof shall
specifically be identified." Id. at 5.
377. See Memorandum in Response to Order, Republican Party of N.C., No. 88-263-
CIV-5 (E.D.N.C. May 14, 1990); Republican Party of N.C., No. 88-263-CIV-5, at 2-3
(E.D.N.C. Nov. 7, 1990) (order denying a motion for protective order and holding in
abeyance a motion to quash subpoena). The court examined a 32-page list and 369
documents. See Republican Party of N.C., No. 88-263-CIV-5-F, at 2 (E.D.N.C. Jan. 18,
1991) (order demanding compliance with subpoena). In its analysis, the court applied the
attorney-client privilege and the work-product doctrine "strictly" and "narrowly." Id. at 8,
16. The court cited Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981), and lower-court
cases for the attorney-client privilege, see Republican Party of N.C., No. 88-263-CIV-5-F,
at 8-14 (E.D.N.C. Jan. 18, 1991) (order demanding compliance with subpoena), and it
recognized the Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947), origins and lower-court
applications of the work-product doctrine, see Republican Party of N.C., No. 88-263-CIV-
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The doctrine of executive privilege, which Governor Martin
asserted and then waived,37 has a long history and became widely
known when the Supreme Court rejected President Nixon's claim of
protection from subpoena of the infamous White House tape
recordings of his conversations with his aides concerning the
Watergate scandal.3 79  Although most executive-privilege cases
involve claims by the president or other federal officers, variations of
the doctrine also apply to state officers.8 While the doctrine
continues to evolve at the presidential level amid some assertions and
waivers of it in independent counsel investigations,8 ' its application
to the governor of North Carolina awaits future developments.3 2
5-F, at 15-20 (E.D.N.C. Jan. 18, 1991) (order demanding compliance with subpoena). The
court did not discuss the status of the Governor's counsel as state employees, and thus its
order did not presage the recent rulings that a federal independent counsel may discover
federally employed attorneys regarding discussions at the White House. See infra note
381.
378. See Reply of Governor James G. Martin to Plaintiffs' and Intervenor's Responses
at 6-7, Republican Party of N.C., No. 88-263-CIV-5 (E.D.N.C. June 15, 1990) (asserting
executive privilege); Memorandum in Support of Motion to Quash Subpoena Pursuant to
Rule 45(b) and for Protective Order Pursuant to Rule 26(c) at 3, Republican Party of N.C.,
No. 88-263-CIV-5, (E.D.N.C. May 14, 1990) (same).
379. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683,713 (1974).
380. See Centifanti v. Nix, 865 F.2d 1422, 1432 (3d Cir. 1989) (denying discovery of a
state-agency letter reflecting "the deliberative process of government policymakers" as
"protected by the predecisional governmental privilege").
381. See In re Bruce R. Lindsey (Grand Jury Testimony), 158 F.3d 1263, 1277-78 (D.C.
Cir. 1998) (affirming, in the absence of an appeal on the issue of executive privilege, the
district court's denial of a claim of governmental attorney-client privilege made by Deputy
White House Counsel and Assistant to the President who were subject to subpoena to
testify about possible criminal conduct by government officials and others); In re Sealed
Case, 121 F.3d 729, 757-62 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (holding that executive privilege was
insufficient to stymie production of documents of White House Counsel pertaining to an
internal investigation of allegations against former Secretary of Agriculture Mike Espy
when the Office of Independent Counsel had made a "sufficient showing of need"); In re
Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d. 910, 914, 924-26 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding,
after a waiver of executive privilege, that attorney-client privilege and work-product
doctrine did not protect documents of attorneys from the Office of Counsel to the
President pertaining to meetings attended by them with the First Lady from discovery by
the Office of Independent Counsel); see also REFERRAL TO THE UNITED STATES HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES PURSUANT TO TITLE 28, UNITED STATES CODE, § 595(c),
reprinted in THE STARR REPORT, THE FINDINGS OF INDEPENDENT COUNSEL KENNETH
W. STARR ON PRESIDENT CLINTON AND THE LEWINSKY AFFAIR, at 206-09 (Public
Affairs ed. 1998) (discussing President Clinton's assertions of executive privilege during
the Monica Lewinsky investigation). For another case not involving executive privilege
but rejecting an assertion of protective-function privilege, see In re Sealed Case, 148 F.3d
1073,1079 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
382. In a recent legislative investigation of a personnel action by the governor's office,
evidence was given by the governor's office, apparently without assertion of executive
privilege. See HOUSE SELECC COMMrrrEE FOR PERSONNEL REVIEW REPORT, supra
note 297, at 3-4.
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Distinguished from executive privilege is executive immunity
from damages liability.3H The state, along with its governor and its
other executive officers in their official capacities, are absolutely
immune from federal liability for damages allegedly arising from any
official acts.s Damage claims can be asserted against the governor
and other executive officers in their individual capacities, however,
for alleged deprivations of federal rights under color of state law. The
executive officers are protected individually against such claims only
by qualified immunity.3 s5  The Supreme Court has articulated
executive officials' qualified immunity as "an immunity from suit
rather than a mere defense to liability" that applies "in cases where
the legal norms the officials are alleged to have violated were not
clearly established at the time.
'386
Application of the qualified immunity standard can be
problematic in the context of the governor's hiring and firing of
subordinates. In the early stages of the Stott litigation, the district
court denied the protection of qualified immunity to the Governor
and three department heads in connection with the discharges of the
383. The President has absolute immunity from damages liability predicated on his
official acts, see Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 753-54 (1982), but not his unofficial acts
occurring prior to incumbency, see Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 684 (1997).
384. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-68 (1985); Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S.
123,148-49 (1908); JOHN V. ORTH, THE JUDICIAL POWER OF THE UNITED STATES: THE
ELEVENTH AMENDMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 136-52 (1987); see also Alden v. Maine,
119 S. Ct. 2240, 2266 (1999) (holding that a state's immunity from suit is a fundamental
aspect of sovereignty preceding ratification of the Constitution and the Eleventh
Amendment).
385. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 247-49 (1974); McConnell v. Adams, 829
F.2d 1319, 1324-26 (4th Cir. 1987); Gibbons v. Bond, 523 F. Supp. 843, 853-54 (W.D. Mo.
1981), aff'd, 668 F.2d 967 (8th Cir. 1982).
386. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985) (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S.
800, 817-18 (1982)). Harlow is the leading qualified immunity case for executive officers.
Although it was an action against former federal officials and not one against state
officials, the Court made clear that the same standards of qualified immunity apply in
either type of action. See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818 & n.30; see also Johnson v. Fankell, 520
U.S. 911, 914 (1997) ("We have recognized a qualified immunity defense for both federal
officials sued under the implied cause of action... and state officials sued under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983."); Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 305-06 (1996) (describing the qualified
immunity defense); Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 314 (1995) (discussing the assertion of
qualified immunity in the context of an appeal). The Court recently stated in another
context that "immunities are grounded in 'the nature of the function performed, not, the
identity of the actor who performed it.' " Clinton, 520 U.S. at 695 (quoting Forrester v.
White, 484 U.S. 219,229 (1988)). Before that formulation of qualified immunity, the Court
had rejected absolute immunity for a governor and other state officials presumed by the
court below to have acted in good faith in ordering the state's national guard to suppress a
student uprising on a state university campus. See Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 234-35 (1974).
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three initial plaintiffs.3 7 The Fourth Circuit did not discuss qualified
immunity when it reversed the district court's decision regarding class
certification, but it vacated all other orders of the district court?"8 On
remand, the district court dismissed the claims of the three named
plaintiffs on the merits but declined to decide the issue of qualified
immunity?
89
Meanwhile, the First Circuit decided numerous Elrod-Branti
claims after the 1984 elections and held that the newly-elected
officials were "at least reasonable in believing the law was not clearly
established [and] that they [were] entitled to qualified immunity from
suit" for dismissing employees of the former administration.39 The
First Circuit concluded that, while the application of the Elrod-Branti
test might be clear in some cases, "in others it will be sufficiently
fraught with uncertainty that an official could not be faulted for
failing to apprehend."3 91
Similarly, the Fourth Circuit had noted in 1984 that the law with
respect to qualified immunity for the hiring decisions of incoming
administrations "is still evolving and is by no means yet
authoritatively settled in all its critical aspects."392 In 1987, the circuit
387. See Stott I, 725 F. Supp 1365, 1441 (E.D.N.C. 1989) (noting the court's previous
order denying qualified immunity to defendants). No immediate appeal was taken from
that initial denial of qualified immunity; only later, after lengthy proceedings and
extensive discovery had occurred and the other department heads appointed by the
governor-joined as defendants in 1987-had claimed qualified immunity, was an
assertion made of an interlocutory right of appeal. See id. at 1441-45. The First Circuit
had held that an interlocutory appeal is proper following a denial of summary judgment of
qualified immunity against such a claim. See De Abadia v. Izquierdo Mora, 792 F.2d 1187,
1190 (1st Cir. 1986). At this stage, the Stott I court recognized qualified immunity for five
department heads against eleven class members' claims and dismissed two department
heads as defendants, but the court denied qualified immunity against the remaining
approximately 120 class members' claims and the three named plaintiffs' claims, leaving
the Governor, seven then-present, and six former department heads as defendants. Stott 1,
725 F. Supp. at 1442-46.
388. See Stott 11, 916 F.2d at 146; see also Jenkins v. Medford, 119 F.3d 1156, 1165 (4th
Cir. 1997) (en banc), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 881 (1998) (dismissing a § 1983 suit brought
against a sheriff by deputies who were fired shortly after the sheriffs election and noting
that the dismissal for failure to state a claim "makes it unnecessary for us to consider
whether [the sheriff] is entitled to qualified immunity").
389. See Stott 111, 783 F. Supp. 970,993 (E.D.N.C. 1992).
390. De Abadia, 792 F.2d at 1193.
391. Id. For a survey of much of the patronage litigation, see generally Brinkley, supra
note 330.
392. Jones v. Dodson, 727 F.2d 1329, 1333 (4th Cir. 1984). The Dodson holding on the
Elrod-Branti claim asserted there, protecting a deputy sheriff from discharge, see id. at
1337-39, has since been disapproved by the Fourth Circuit, see Jenkins v. Medford, 119
F.3d 1156,1164 (4th Cir. 1997) (en banc).
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held that qualified immunity applies in an Elrod-Branti case.3 93 More
recently, the Fourth Circuit has emphasized that "[d]espite the
[Supreme] Court's guidance lower courts have issued 'conflicting and
confusing' opinions."'394 Thus, the district court's initial rejection of
qualified immunity in Stott v. Martin, of limited precedential value in
any event, should be viewed as clearly erroneous in light of the
Fourth Circuit's decisions.
3 95
The seven years of litigation, extensive discovery of the
Governor and nine principal departments of state government, and
considerable expense involved in Stott illustrate the potential costs
justifying qualified immunity from suit, including "distraction of
officials from their official duties, inhibition of discretionary action,
and deterrence of able people from government service.
396
Arguably, the same principles that establish qualified immunity from
damages claims for governors in their individual capacities extend to
qualified immunity in their official capacities from injunction claims,
but the courts have not yet recognized such an extension. Absent
393. See McConnell v. Adams, 829 F.2d 1319,1324-26 (4th Cir. 1987). As early as 1981,
a district court had held that a Governor and a state department head were immune from
damages for discharging an employee because of his political affiliation, since the court
could not conclude that they "knew or reasonably should have known" that the discharge
violated the employees' federal constitutional rights. See Gibbons v. Bond, 523 F. Supp.
843,854 (W.D. Mo. 1981), afd, 668 F.2d 967 (8th Cir. 1982).
394. Jenkins, 119 F.3d at 1160 (quoting Upton v. Thompson, 930 F.2d 1209, 1212 (7th
Cir. 1991)).
395. See StottHI, 916 F.2d 134,146 (4th Cir. 1990) (vacating the district court decision in
Stott 1, 725 F. Supp. 1365 (E.D.N.C. 1989)).
396. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800,816 (1982).
397. In its leading qualified-immunity case for executive officers, Mitchell v. Forsyth,
472 U.S. 511, 515 (1985), the Supreme Court recognized an approach to qualified
immunity for government officials under which the "consequences" of standing trial must
be considered to avoid
subject[ing] government officials either to the costs of trial or to the burdens of
broad-reaching discovery" in cases where the legal norms the officials are alleged
to have violated were not clearly established at the time .... Harlow thus
recognized an entitlement not to stand trial or face the other burdens of
litigation, conditioned on the resolution of the essentially legal question whether
the conduct of which the plaintiff complains violated clearly established law. The
entitlement is an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability; and
like an absolute immunity, it is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted
to go to trial.
Id. at 526 (quoting Harlow, 457 U.S. at 817-18). As the Fourth Circuit recently noted in an
interlocutory appeal from a denial of a motion to dismiss, the defense of qualified
immunity "exists to 'give government officials a right, not merely to avoid "standing trial,"
but also to avoid the burdens of "such pretrial matters as discovery."' " Jenkins, 119 F.3d
at 1159 (quoting Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 308 (1996) (quoting Mitchell, 472 U.S.
at 526)). Elrod-Branti cases, replete with such burdens and much uncertainty, seemingly
provide a perfect opportunity for recognizing qualified immunity from injunction claims.
1999] 2105
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
such an extension of qualified immunity principles, the governor may
be subject to prospective injunctive relief in some circumstances
regarding the hiring and firing of subordinates. The potential for such
relief has significant implications. For instance, a broad injunction,
like that sought by the Stott plaintiffs, would essentially involve
judicial management of the personnel policies and practices of the
governor and his appointed department heads. 39  In other
circumstances, federal courts have ordered prospective injunctive
relief, including on-going judicial supervision, for state-action
appointments.
399
State separation-of-powers principles constrain the authority of
state courts over executive actions, and state courts generally will not
compel an executive act.4° Thus, state courts should not interfere
with the governor's authorized appointment or removal of an
executive officer.40' Judicial review in state court of executive actions
may occur in other circumstances, 402 however, including those
affecting state employment, as illustrated by two recent cases deciding
whether the Governor had correctly designated state employees as
Nevertheless, the Stott district court rejected an argument for qualified immunity from
injunction made by a successor department head not even alleged to have committed any
wrongful act. See Stott 1, 725 F. Supp. 1365, 1380, 1440-41, 1446 (E.D.N.C. 1989);
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendant Pope, at
24-28, Stott 1, 725 F. Supp. 1365 (E.D.N.C. 1989) (Nos. 85-818-CIV-5, 86-650-CIV-5, 86-
683-CIV-5).
398. See StottII, 916 F.2d at 137 & n.4 (noting the Governor and individual department
heads as named defendants).
399. See Mayor of Philadelphia v. Educational Equal. League, 415 U.S. 605, 622-23
(1974) (reversing a court-ordered supervision of a new mayor's appointments where the
former mayor had discriminated on the basis of race in making appointments); see also
McConnell v. Adams, 829 F.2d 1319, 1322 (4th Cir. 1987) (affirming court-ordered
reappointment of officials not reappointed solely because of their political party
affiliation).
400. See, e.g., Person v. Watts, 184 N.C. 499, 502, 115 S.E. 336, 339 (i922) (dismissing
an action for mandamus against the revenue commissioner). Those principles are a matter
of state law, and under the "dual sovereignty" of federalism, Printz v. United States, 521
U.S. 898, 918 (1997), the state may distribute its governmental powers among its branches
independent of the federal constitutional principle of separation of powers. See State ex
rel. Martin v. Melott, 320 N.C. 518, 524,359 S.E.2d 783,787 (1987) (plurality opinion). At
the federal level, courts are reluctant to compel the executive, especially the president, to
perform a discretionary act. See Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 802-03 (1992)
(plurality opinion).
401. See State ex rel. Caldwell v. Wilson, 121 N.C. 323, 344, 28 S.E. 554, 556-57 (1897);
James v. Hunt, 43 N.C. App. 109,120-21,258 S.E.2d 481,488 (1979).
402. See Frye Regional Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Hunt, 350 N.C. 39, 43, 510 S.E.2d 159, 162
(1999) (involving judicial review of the Governor's amendment to the state medical
facilities plan and holding that the Governor had statutory authority to amend the plan).
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exempt under the State Personnel Act.4 3
Thus, the potential exists for a federal or state court4°4 to prevent
a governor from firing certain subordinates belonging to an opposing
political party, in effect locking political opponents into the
bureaucracy. The potential also exists for a court to order a governor
to hire a political opponent, in effect giving the opponent the keys to
the bureaucracy. Fortunately, however, there is some recognition
within the judiciary of the limited role that the courts should play in
deciding constitutional claims involving public employment. 4 5
C. The Old Bureaucratic Model and New Dynamics
Although the Supreme Court rejected the firing of some lower-
level public employees on the basis of political-party affiliation in
Elrod4 6 and Branti,4 7 and then .rejected hirings on that basis in
Rutan,4°s the requirement that states have a republican form of
government nevertheless remains.4 9  The republican form of
government gives voters the right to choose their own officers for
403. See, e.g., Powell v. North Carolina Dep't of Transp., 347 N.C. 614, 625,499 S.E.2d
180, 186 (1998) (upholding Governor Hunt's designation of the director of the North
Carolina Highway Beautification Program as policymaking-exempt under the State
Personnel Act); North Carolina Dep't of Transp. v. Hodge, 347 N.C. 602, 607, 499 S.E.2d
187, 190 (1998) (rejecting Governor Hunt's designation of departmental internal auditor
as an exempt policymaking position under the State Personnel Act).
404. State courts have concurrent jurisdiction with federal courts over claims for
deprivation of rights under color of state law pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Crump v.
Board of Educ., 326 N.C. 603,614,392 S.E.2d 579,585 (1990).
405. See, e.g., Gregory v. Durham County Bd. of Educ., 591 F. Supp. 145, 156
(M.D.N.C. 1984). The Gregory court stated:
Federal courts do not pass on the wisdom of the personnel actions challenged or
even their fundamental fairness. Rather, the need to preserve the independence
of public management and scarce judicial resources, among other considerations,
restricts the courts' inquiry to whether the personnel actions qualify under
stringent tests promulgated by the Supreme Court as constitutional violations.
I&.
406. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347,372-73 (1976).
407. Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507,519-20 (1980).
408. Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62, 65 (1990).
409. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. Questions arising under the Guarantee Clause have
been regarded as non-justiciable political questions, their resolution resting instead with
Congress. See Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 42 (1849). But cf New York v.
United States, 505 U.S. 144, 185 (1992) (noting that commentators have "suggested that
courts should address the merits of [Guarantee Clause] claims, at least in some
circumstances" but stating that it "need not resolve this difficult question today");
Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 463 (1991) (stating that the "authority of the people of
the States to determine the qualifications of their government officials is, of course, not
without limit" and noting that "our review of citizenship requirements under the political
function exception is less exacting, but it is not absent").
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state government.10 In order for such a government to be responsive
to the people, the elected officials must have some subordinates who
are responsive to their election platforms and political priorities.41
Governor Hunt has explained that the inability of the executive to
select some loyal subordinates would result in "a rigid bureaucracy
that would be completely ineffective in letting the people work their
will much as you have in totalitarian societies.
412
As a result, when applying Elrod-Branti, the circuit courts of
appeals have recognized certain underlying assumptions about the
operation of government. First, Elrod and Branti seek to promote
governmental efficiency by permitting decision-makers to mandate
policies for implementation by ministerial employees. 13 In such a
bureaucracy, an elected official must have loyal policy-making
assistants.4 4  Second, the courts have acknowledged that
"representative government needs a certain amount of leeway for
partisan selection of agents in order to work. '415 Accordingly, the
Elrod-Branti "appropriateness" standard is a corollary to
representative government, and a newly elected administration must
have "significant facilitators of policy" who have "personal and
partisan loyalty. '416 As one court has explained, loyal subordinates
promote the goals of representative democracy, while their absence
"'undercuts' such government. ' 417
Concerns about governmental efficiency and representative
government extend beyond the political affiliation of public
employees to their political activities. While political affiliation cases
are controlled by Elrod-Branti standards, political activity cases are
410. See In re Duncan, 139 U.S. 449,461 (1891).
411. See Jenkins v. Medford, 119 F.3d 1156, 1162 (4th Cir. 1997) (quoting Upton v.
Thompson, 930 F.2d 1209,1215 (7th Cir. 1989)).
412. Deposition of James B. Hunt, Jr., at 87, Stott 1, 725 F. Supp. 1365 (E.D.N.C. 1989)
(Nos. 85-818-CIV-5, 86-650-CIV-5, 86-683-CIV-5).
413. See Meeks v. Grimes, 779 F.2d 417,422 (7th Cir. 1985).
414. See id. "As we must recognize, however, no structure can approach the old-
fashioned textbook ideal in which bureaucrats merely carry out or execute policy
directives chosen for them .... " JAMEs M. BUCHANAN, THE LIMITS OF LIBERTY:
BETWEEN ANARCHY AND LEVIATHAN 161 (1975). Moreover, "[t]he authors of the
United States Constitution ... did not foresee the necessity or need of controlling the
growth of self-government .... The system of checks and balances, ultimately derivative
from Montesquieu, has rarely been interpreted to have as one of its objectives the limiting
of the growth of the government." Id at 162.
415. Jimenez Fuentes v. Torres Gaztambide, 807 F.2d 236, 241 (1st Cir. 1986) (en
banc).
416. Id.
417. Id. (quoting Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347,367 (1976)).
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controlled by the decisions in Pickering v. Board of Education418 and
Connick v. Meyers41 9 where the Supreme Court applied a balancing
test for determining the permissibility of public employees' political
activities. 420 The Pickering-Connick test recognizes the need for
governmental efficiency by requiring "full consideration of the
government's interest in the effective and efficient fulfillment of its
responsibilities to the public."421 Citing a century-old case recognizing
the legitimacy of promoting efficiency, integrity, and discipline in
public service,4' the Connick Court declared that "'the Government,
as an employer, must have wide discretion and control over the
management of its personnel and internal affairs.' "I2
Nevertheless, the Court long ago rejected Justice Holmes'
famous dictum about a public employee's having "a constitutional
right to talk politics," but no constitutional right to be a public
employee.424 Public employees have First Amendment protection
under the Court's "modern 'unconstitutional conditions' doctrine. '425
This doctrine protects against dismissal for refusing to take an oath
regarding political affiliation,426 for publicly or privately criticizing a
governmental employer's policies,427  for expressing hostility
prominent political figures (certainly including a governor),428 for
418. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
419. 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
420. See id at 154 (holding that an assistant district attorney who circulated a
questionnaire among other employees after a notice of change in case assignments was
lawfully discharged for refusing to accept changes and that her communications concerned
matters of private interest, not public concern); Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569, 673-75 (holding
that a teacher who published criticism of school board policies was wrongfully discharged
and that the teacher's interest in public comment must be balanced against the state's
interest in promoting efficiency of its employees); see also Stephen Allred, From Connick
to Confiusion" The Struggle to Define Speech on Matters of Public Concern, 64 IND. LJ. 43,
44-50 (1988) (describing the Pickering-Connick balancing test).
421. Connick, 461 U.S. at 150.
422- See id. at 150-51 (quoting Ex Parte Curtis, 106 U.S. 371,373 (1882)).
423. Id. at 150 (quoting Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 168 (1974) (Powell, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the result in part)).
424. Board of County Comm'rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 674 (1996) (quoting
McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517,517 (Mass. 1892)).
425. Id.
426. See Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 608-10 (1967) (holding that a
state university could not require a faculty member to certify that he was not a
Communist).
427. See Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. V. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274,281-87 (1977)
(holding that an untenured teacher could not be discharged because he complained to a
radio station about school dress and appearance requirements, but that the public
employer may offer proof that it would have discharged him in any event because of
altercation with another teacher and for making obscene gestures to students).
428. See Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 381, 392 (1987) (holding that the
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other expressive activities 2 9 and for making or not making political
contributions. 430
Thus, under the Pickering-Connick balancing test, if "a matter of
public concern was implicated [by an employee's political activities]
the court must consider whether the employee's interest in the speech
was outweighed by the employer's 'interest in the effective and
efficient fulfillment of its responsibilities to the public.' "431 As the
Fifth Circuit concluded, the government has an interest in providing
elected officials with "the power to implement policy for which they
must answer to the voters. In more familiar language, knowing that
the buck stops, and where, is a substantial government interest."43 2
In North Carolina state government, the bureaucratic buck
supposedly stops with the governor. Under this bureaucratic model,
the governor has much power to implement policies through
subordinates, subject to the federal constitutional constraints
discussed above and the civil service protection provided state
employees under the State Personnel Act. 33 Nevertheless, as state
government continues to grow both in budget and bureaucracy, 34
some commentators question the governor's ability to manage this
extensive bureaucracy effectively, and they advocate a smaller state
government that is more effective and efficient."35 Several recent
discharge of a deputy constable who, upon learning of the assassination attempt on
President Reagan, remarked to a co-worker, "if they go for him again, I hope they get
him," was unconstitutional).
429. See United States v. Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454,470 (1995) (holding
that a law forbidding government employees from accepting honoraria "imposes the kind
of burden that abridges speech under the First Amendment").
430. See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 234 (1977) (holding that
government employment cannot be conditioned on making or not making financial
contributions to particular causes).
431. Joyner v. Lancaster, 815 F.2d 20, 23 (4th Cir. 1987) (quoting Connick v. Meyers,
461 U.S. 138,150 (1983)); see also Board of County Comm'rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 675
(1996) ("The First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of speech protects government
employees from termination because of their speech on matters of public concern.");
Boring v. Buncombe County Bd. of Educ., 136 F.3d. 364, 368 (4th Cir. 1998), cert. denied,
119 S. Ct. 47 (1998) (holding that a public school drama teacher had no First Amendment
rights in selecting a particular play because such a decision "does not present a matter of
public concern and is nothing more than an ordinary employment dispute").
432. Gonzalez v. Benavides, 712 F.2d 142,148 (5th Cir. 1983).
433. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 126-1 to -90 (1999).
434. See HARLAN E. BOYLES, KEEPER OF THE PUBLIC PURSE 4-6 (1994); JOHN
HOOD & DON CARRINGTON, CHANGING COURSE II: AN ALTERNATIVE BUDGET FOR
NORTH CAROLINA 3 (1997); Michael Lowrey, Feeding at the Trough: Why North
Carolina State Taxes and Spending Keep Growing, CAROLINA J., June/July 1998, at 17.
435. See, e.g., JOHN LOCKE FOUNDATION, BRIEFING PAPER No. 3, REORGANIZING
STATE GovERNMENT 2 (1996).
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events have given momentum to advocates for reduction and reform
of government. First, the elected Secretary of State resigned in 1996
following an auditor's report of irregularities and mismanagement in
his office.436  Soon thereafter, another high-level official, the
appointed State Motor Vehicles Commissioner, resigned amid
charges of irregularities and mismanagement. 437  After the
Commissioner's resignation, a legislative committee investigated the
Department of Motor Vehicles and the Governor's Office because of
a settlement payment by the Governor's Office to a former
department employee.4 8 In addition, the former division director
who resigned has pled guilty to a misdemeanor in connection with an
earlier investigation of the employee's activities.439 Displeased with
such incidents, the 1997 session of the General Assembly amended
the State Personnel Act.440
D. The Bureaucratic Rank and File: Patronage and Personnel Act
Reform
The State Personnel Act was enacted in 19491 and was amended
several times before the 1997 amendments.442  Its primary purpose
436. See Twenty Months of Scandal, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Dec. 7,1997,
at 25A.
437. See id.
438. See HOUSE SELECr COMMITTEE FOR PERSONNEL REvIEW REPORT, supra note
297, at 3-6.
439. See Twenty Months of Scandal, supra note 436, at 25A.
440. See Act of Aug. 28, 1997, ch. 520, §§ 1-6, 1997 N.C. Sess. Laws 2324, 2324-35
(amending N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 126-14.2, 126-14.4, 126-5, 126-34.1, 126-84, 126-85); Act of
July 21, 1997, ch. 349, §§ 1-4, 1997 N.C. Sess. Laws 858, 858-62 (amending N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 126-1,126-3, 126-4).
441. See Act of Apr. 1, 1949, ch 718, §§ 1-8, 1949 N.C. Sess. Laws 747, 747-57; see also
Act of May 20, 1965, ch. 640, §§ 1-4, 1965 N.C. Sess. Laws 708, 708-13 (abolishing the
Merit System Council and the State Personnel Council and establishing a State Personnel
Board). "During the 20th century, monumental evolutionary changes occurred with
respect to personnel management systems affecting North Carolina's State employees.
These changes include milestones such as the adoption of the State Personnel Act ... in
1949, and the 1965 establishment of a unified personnel system and the State Personnel
Board." HOUSE SELECr COMMITEE FOR PERSONNEL REVIEW REPORT, supra note
297, at 15. That legislative committee has recommended creation of a Blue Ribbon
Advisory Commission on the 21st Century Vision of the State's Workforce to review the
state personnel system and to recommend appropriate legislation for reforming it. See id.
at 15-16. Civil service protection began at the federal level with the Civil Service
(Pendleton) Act, ch. 27, 22 Stat. 403, 403-07 (1883). See generally Developments in the
Law: Public Employment, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1611, 1619-76 (1984) (describing the
evolution of public employment statutes).
442. See, e.g., Act of June 18, 1975, ch. 667, §§ 8-9, 1975 N.C. Sess. Laws 809, 810-11
(amending N.C. GEN. STAT. § 126-5); see also North Carolina Dep't of Correction v. Hill,
313 N.C. 481, 486, 329 S.E.2d 377, 380 (1985) (noting that before 1975 the Act contained
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remains "to establish for the government of the State a system of
personnel administration under the Governor, based on accepted
principles of personnel administration and applying the best methods
as evolved in government and industry." 3 The Act defines career
state employees, 44 establishes the State Personnel Commission
appointed by the governor,445 and establishes the Office of State
Personnel and a state personnel director who is appointed by the
governor and under the supervision of the Commission.46 Subject to
the governor's approval, the Act empowers the Commission to
establish policies and rules governing position classification plans,
compensation plans, position qualifications, and other employment
terms, including "appointment, promotion, transfer, demotion and
suspension of employees" and "separation of employees."447 A major
substantive provision protects career state employees under the Act
from adverse personnel actions, such as discharge or demotion,
without "just cause. ' 448
The Act applies to all state employees not "exempt." 449 Except
for provisions for equal opportunityt 5 and privacy of employee
records,45' the Act explicitly exempts constitutional officers, officers
and employees of the judiciary, officers and employees of the General
Assembly, non-salaried members of boards, committees commissions,
and councils, and numerous others, such as certain state university
employees.452 It similarly exempts employees of the Office of the
Governor that the governor designates "in his discretion' '4 3 and
extends similar exemption power to the lieutenant governor.454 The
Act also exempts from the "just cause" limitation one "confidential
assistant and two confidential secretaries" for each elected or
appointed department head as well as "one confidential secretary"
for each chief deputy or chief administrative assistant.4s5 5 Before the
no provisions exempting policymaking positions from its application).
443. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 126-1 (1999).
444. See id. § 126-1.1.
445. See id. § 126-2. Since 1976, those appointments are subject to confirmation by the
General Assembly. See id.
446. See id. § 126-3.
447. Id. § 126-4.
448. See id. § 126-35.
449. See id. § 126-5(a)(1).
450. See id. §§ 126-16 to 126-19.
451. See id. §§ 126-22 to 126-30.
452 See id. § 126-5(cl).
453. See id. § 126-5(cl)(6).
454. See id. § 126-5(cl)(7).
455. See id. § 126-5(c)(2).
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1997 amendments, the Act separately empowered the governor to
designate a limited number of exempt "policymaking positions"
within each of the nine departments headed by his appointees. 56 The
Act extended similar exemption authority to the eight elected
members of the Council of State who head departments.4 7
Before and after the 1997 amendments, the governor and the
lieutenant governor can control employment of subordinates in their
offices, and the governor and the other Council of State members,
now with one exception,458 can control employment of "policymaking
positions" in nine and eight departments respectively. In addition,
each of those seventeen department heads can control employment of
three "confidential" subordinates, and that control extends to one
such subordinate for each department chief deputy and chief
administrative assistant.459  The exempt subordinates and
policymakers are not entitled to the "just cause" civil service
protection otherwise afforded under the Act.' Nor are they subject
to the Act's prohibitions of certain political activities by state
employees.461 Thus, not only does the Act allow some patronage, it
implicitly allows exempt employees to engage in some political
activities and to be solicited for political contributions. 2
As publicly reported, Governor Hunt utilized a patronage system
during his first two terms.463 When he first took office in 1977, he
followed Governor Holshouser, the first Republican governor this
century.4 4 In the Holshouser administration, there were only sixty-
456. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 126-5(d)(1), 12.6-5(b) (1994) (amended 1997).
Section 126-5(b) defines such a position as one "delegated with the authority to impose
the final decision as to a settled course of action to be followed within a department,
agency, or division." Id. § 126-5(b)(3).
457. See id. § 126-5(d)(1) (1994) (amended 1997).
458. Earlier, the superintendent of public instruction, a member of the Council of
State, could designate "exempt policymaking positions," see id. § 126-5(d)(1) (1994)
(amended 1997), but under the 1997 amendments the state Board of Education may
designate both new categories of "exempt positions" in the department of public
instruction. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 126-5(d)(2) (1999).
459. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 126-5(c)(2) (1999); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 126-5(c)(2) (1994).
460. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 126-35 (1999); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 126.5 (1990).
461. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 126-13(a) (1999); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 126-13(a) (1992).
462. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 126-14.1(a) (1999); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 126-14.1(a) (1992).
463. See, e.g., John Hood, Hunt Finds Religion on Patronage, TRIANGLE Bus. J., July
11, 1997, at 63.
464. See id.; Heath, supra note 202, at 19. During the Republican governor's
administration, Democrats dominated the General Assembly, and "there was a great hue
and cry that the power and discretion of the governor must be checked with regard to"
state employees. Deposition of James B. Hunt, Jr., at 65, Stott I, 725 F. Supp. 1365
(E.D.N.C. 1989) (Nos. 85-818-CIV-5, 86-650-CIV-5, 86-683-CIV-5). Major changes in the
State Personnel Act resulted. See Act of June 18, 1975, ch. 667, §§ 1-13, 1975 N.C. Sess.
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eight employees designated as exempt, although other Holshouser
supporters attained state employment in positions then covered by
the Act.46 5  After taking office, Governor Hunt designated 868
positions as exempt and, therefore, held by employees serving at will;
as a result, many Holshouser administration employees were
discharged by the Hunt administration.4  There were approximately
1500 exempt positions when Governor Hunt left office in 1985.467
Consistent with a goal of the Martin administration, that number was
reduced,46 only to increase again in Governor Hunt's next terms
beginning in 1993.4 9 Some of the Hunt administration's 1993 changes
resulted in litigation, recently resolved by the state supreme court.470
In 1997, apparently responding to some criticisms of his past
personnel policies, Governor Hunt reduced the number of exempt
positions from 575 to 99.471 That reduction in exempt positions, and
concomitant increase in protected positions, prompted criticism that
Governor Hunt was attempting to force hundreds of his political
appointees upon his successor through expanded civil service
protections.472 More significantly, however, Governor Hunt endorsed
proposals to amend the State Personnel Act and reform the
patronage system he once perfected.473
The 1997 amendments changed the definitions of exempt
positions and reduced their potential number. An "exempt position"
now includes an "exempt policymaking position," which retains its
earlier definition with the added limitation "that a loyalty to the
Governor or other elected department head in their respective offices
is reasonably necessary to implement the policies of their offices." 474
The amendments also included a new category of "exempt
managerial position[s]," which are defined as posts having such
essential "managerial or programmatic responsibility" that the
application of just-cause limitations to discharge or demotion "would
Laws 809-13 (amending N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 126-2 to 126-5).
465. See Hood, supra note 463, at 63.
466. See U.
467. See Stott 11, 916 F.2d 134,137 n.2 (4th Cir. 1990).
46& See id. at 142 n.1.
469. See Hood, supra note 463, at 63.
470. See supra note 403 and accompanying text.
471. See John Wagner, House Approves Patronage-Reform Measure, NEWS &
OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Aug. 28,1997, at 3A.
472. See !i
473. See Hood, supra note 463, at 63.
474. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 126-5(b)(1) to 126-5(b)(3) (1999); see also Jones v. Dodson,
727 F.2d 1329, 1334-35 n.6 (4th Cir. 1984) (describing "'personal political loyalty'
situations").
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cause undue disruption to the operations of the agency, department,
institution, or division."4 75  With the definitional change, "exempt
policymaking positions" may be designated as exempt under the Act.
Exempt employees have limited civil service protection under the
Act, such as equal opportunity and privacy of their employee records,
and may be discharged or demoted without just cause.476 The newly
defined "exempt managerial positions" also may be designated as
exempt under the Act. They are, however, covered by other
provisions for employment policies, rules, and plans-not just those
for equal opportunity and records privacy.477 More significantly, as
part of a "policy of nonpolitical hiring practices,""47 the "exempt
management positions" are covered by new provisions that bar
political hirings and promote open and fair competition for
employment.479 Thus, the holders of "exempt managerial" positions
may be discharged or demoted regardless of just cause, but they may
be hired only pursuant to the new limitations on political hirings and
to requirements for open and fair competition for employment.4s
Under the new definitions, the governor may now designate "a
total of one hundred exempt policymaking positions throughout" the
nine departments headed by his appointees!"' In addition, for the
same departments, the governor may designate "exempt managerial
positions in a number up to one percent (1%) of the total number of
full-time positions in each" such department.4 The eight elected
department heads of the Council of State, with one exception, may
also designate "exempt policymaking positions" and "exempt
managerial positions" in their respective departments; each category
may consist of twenty positions or one percent of the total number of
full-time positions in the department, whichever is greater! 3
The new limitations on political hirings4 4 and provisions for open
475. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 126-5(b)(2) (1999).
476. Id. § 126-5(c)(3).
477. Id. § 126-5(c7).
478. Id. § 126-14.3(8).
479. See id. § 126-5(c7) (applying sections 126-14.2 (limiting political hirings) and 126-
14.3 (requiring open and fair competition)).
480. See id. § 126-5(c7) (citing the new provisions of sections 126-14.2 and 126-14.3).
481. Id. § 126-5(d)(1).
482. Id.
483. See id § 126-5(d)(2). Regarding designations in the Department of Public
Instruction after the 1997 amendments, see supra note 458. The 1997 amendments also
amended provisions for the governor and the others to request that additional positions be
designated as "exempt," with prescribed procedures for forwarding such requests to the
General Assembly. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 126-5(d)(2a) (1999).
484. See id. § 126-14.2.
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and fair competition for employment4s5 are added to earlier
provisions regarding the political activities of state employees.486 The
General Assembly has established state policies of "nonpolitical
hiring" 487 and of hiring "from the pool of the most qualified
persons." ' The General Assembly has directed the State Personnel
Commission to adopt rules or policies that assure procedures "that
encourage open and fair competition" and "nonpolitical hiring
practices." 4 9  The 1997 amendments also include penalties for
violating the new limitations on political hiring.4 9 Complaints of
adverse employment decisions "because of political affiliation or
political influence" may be made through the Office of
Administrative Hearings, and its investigation, initial determination,
and recommended decision precede a final decision by the State
Personnel Commission.4 91 Complementary amendments were made
to the provisions for contested cases under the State Personnel Act.419
As a result of its investigation into the controversial settlement
payment by the Governor's Office to a former Division of Motor
Vehicles employee,4 93 the General Assembly expanded its "whistle-
blowing"4 94 and anti-retaliation495 protections for state employees to
cover "reporting to public bodies about matters of public concern,
including offering testimony to or testifying before appropriate
legislative panels. '496 In light of revelations that some legislators had
intervened with the executive branch on behalf of that employee, the
General Assembly also declared it "unethical for a legislator to take,
promise, or threaten any legislative action ... for the purpose of
influencing or in retaliation for any action regarding State employee
hirings, promotions, grievances, or disciplinary actions subject to" the
485. See id. § 126-14.3.
486. See id. §§ 126-13, 126-14,126-14.1.
487. Id. § 126-14.3(8).
488. Id § 126-14.2(a). The General Assembly has mandated that "[a]ll State
departments, agencies, and institutions shall select from the pool of the most qualified
persons for State government employment without regard to political affiliation or
political influence." Id. § 126-14.2(b).
489. Id. § 126-14.3(1), (8).
490. See id. § 126-14.4.
491. Id.
492. See id. § 126-34.1.
493. See HOUSE SELECT COMMrrrEE FOR PERSONNEL REVIEW REPORT, supra note
297, at 1.
494. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 126-84 (1999).
495. See id. § 126-85.
496. Id. § 126-84(b); see also id. § 126-85(al) ("No State employee shall retaliate
against another State employee because the employee or a person acting on behalf of the




In another set of 1997 amendments to the State Personnel Act,
the General Assembly expanded the Act's purpose and embraced the
concept of decentralizing its administration.4 9  The purpose of
establishing "a system of personnel administration under the
Governor" remains, but it is now accompanied by the collateral
purpose of providing "for a decentralized system of personnel
administration."4 99 The powers and duties of the State Personnel
Commission now include establishing policies and rules for delegation
of personnel authority "through decentralization agreements with the
heads of State agencies, departments, and institutions. '5 ° The Office
of State Personnel, administered and supervised by an appointee of
the governor and also subject to supervision by the Commission, now
has expanded and specified responsibilities.5 1 Those responsibilities
include negotiating the newly authorized decentralization agreements
for personnel administration.5 2  Such agreements with executive-
branch agencies must designate a person in the agency to be
accountable for the agency's personnel actions.50 3 Absent appropriate
decentralization agreements, the Office of State Personnel is
responsible for administering "centralized programs."5" Under either
a decentralized or centralized program, the head of the agency,
department, or institution is ultimately responsible and accountable
for compliance with State Personnel Commission policies and rules
for their employees.5
Although reflecting legislative disenchantment with some past
patronage practices of the governor, the 1997 amendments
nevertheless leave the governor with the power to control
employment of significant subordinates, including those in his own
office 06 and those in at least one hundred "exempt policymaking
positions" in the nine departments headed by his appointees.5' Just
as before, the governor has no direct control of employment in the
497. Id. § 120-86.1 (1998 Supp.); see also HOUSE SELECr COMMrrEE FOR
PERSONNEL REVIEW REPORT, supra note 297, at 18 (quoting section 120-86.1).
498. See Act of July 21,1997, ch. 349, § 1, 1997 N.C. Sess. Laws 858, 859.
499. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 126-1 (1999).
500. Id. § 126-4(18).
501. See id. § 126-3(b) (establishing "the State Personnel Commission as the policy and
rule-making body").
502. See id. § 126-3(b)(4).
503. See id. § 126-4(18)a.
504. See id. § 126-3(b)(5).
505. See id. § 126-1.
506. See id. § 126-5(cl)(6).
507. See id. § 126-5(d)(1).
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eight departments headed by elected members of the Council of
State.0 8 Furthermore, despite a reported suggestion of depriving the
governor of the power to appoint the state personnel director,50 9 the
1997 amendments leave the appointment of that position and the
appointment of the members of the State Personnel Commission with
the governor 10
V. THE FUTURE OF THE EXECUTIVE BUREAUCRACY
A. The Top of the Bureaucracy- The Future of the Appointment
Power
The suggestion that the governor should not appoint the state
personnel director illustrates the separation-of-powers problem
surviving State ex rel. Martin v. Melott. Although the position is
clearly in the executive branch,511 under the Melott interpretation of
the appointments clause, the General Assembly could constitutionally
provide for appointment to the position by someone other than the
governor, subject only to whatever separation-of-powers constraints
survive Melott 1 2 That question has been avoided for the time being
because the General Assembly continued the statutory provision for
appointment of the personnel director by the governor,5 13 just as it has
continued the provision for appointment by the governor of the heads
of the nine departments not controlled by the elected members of the
Council of State. 4
The suggestion of non-gubernatorial appointment of the state
personnel director also illustrates the problem with the appointments
clause as interpreted in Melott and illuminates the need to reconsider
that interpretation. As explained above, Melott rendered the clause
50& See id. § 126-5(d)(2); infra notes 512-29 and accompanying text.
509. See Wagner, supra note 471, at 3A. Although that reported proposal was not
adopted, another proposal has been made that membership of the State Personnel
Commission be expanded from seven to nine members, including one appointed by the
governor on the recommendation of the speaker of the house and one on the
recommendation of the president pro tem of the senate. See HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE
FOR PERSONNEL REVIEW REPORT, supra note 297, at 14.
510. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 126-3(a), -2(b) (1999). Since 1976, appointments to the
Commission are subject to confirmation by the General Assembly. See id.
511. See id. § 126-3(a).
512. See supra notes 207-41 and accompanying text (discussing Melott).
513. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 126-3(a) (1999).
514. See id. § 143B-9 (1994).
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virtually meaningless. 515 If the separation-of-powers clause is to be
more than a mere proclamation, however, the appointments clause
should not remain meaningless. Should an appropriate case arise, the
state supreme court could give meaning to the clause in a corrective
decision 16 The court could also address the issue in an advisory
opinion, if it considers a request for one.517 Judicial correction may be
unlikely, however, and a constitutional amendment may be necessary
to give the appointments clause meaningful full effect. Although
executive power would be enhanced by restoring the clause to a
meaningful provision for gubernatorial appointment, few people are
probably concerned enough to advocate a constitutional
amendment 1 Effective advocacy of a corrective amendment would
require strong support in the General Assembly, which presumably is
not overly concerned about enhancing the power of the governor.519
Thus, as a discrete issue, amendment of the appointments clause is
not likely, and the clause may remain virtually meaningless for the
foreseeable future.
B. Unitary Executive Power- The Future of the "Short Ballot"
A meaningless appointments clause is not the state's only
separation-of-powers problem, however, and the need for correction
515. See supra note 323 and accompanying text.
516. Prior to Melott, the last appointments clause case decided by the supreme court
was State ex reL Salisbury v. Croom, 167 N.C. 223, 226, 83 S.E.2d 354, 354-55 (1914). But
cf. North Carolina State Bar v. Frazier, 62 N.C. App. 172, 176-77, 302 S.E.2d 648, 651-52
(1983) (stating that legislative appointments did not violate separation of powers, but
citing no case law for that statement). Should another appointments clause case arise, the
supreme court has ample precedent to overrule Melott. See, e.g., Mial v. Ellington, 134
N.C. 131, 139, 46 S.E. 961, 963-64 (1903). The Mial court recognized its duty to overrule
Hoke v. Henderson, 15 N.C. (1 Dev.) 1 (1833), which had held that an office was a contract
and which the court found "stands without support in reason and is opposed to the
uniform, unbroken current of authority in both State and Federal courts," thereby creating
a duty to overrule it in order to "place our jurisprudence in line with that of the other
States and the Federal Government." Mial, 134 N.C. at 139, 156-57, 46 S.E. at 964, 969-70.
"The people of the State could not and would not be prohibited and controlled in the
management of their own institutions and their public policies by judge-made law, which
was denied by all other courts, including the highest at Washington." Id. at 167, 46 S.E. at
973 (Clark, C.J., concurring).
517. See In re Response To Request for Advisory Opinion, 314 N.C. 679, 680, 335
S.E.2d 890, 891 (1985) (noting that, although the "North Carolina Constitution does not
authorize the Supreme Court as a Court to issue advisory opinions," the individual justices
will occasionally issue such opinions, which are not binding on the court, but which "may
be persuasive authority for the points of law addressed").
51& See Beyle & Dalton, supra note 109, at 10-11; cf. Guillory, supra note 139, at 42
(1988) (discussing prospects for the short ballot and quoting John L. Sanders, who said,
"'[A] Governor is not likely to tear his shirt over it.' ").
519. See Beyle & Dalton, supra note 109, at 10-11.
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is better understood in the context of the short ballot proposals. As
discussed above, the voters have long elected eight members of the
Council of State who head departments of the state government. 20
Such a fragmented structure, with the governor appointing nine
statutorily authorized department heads and eight others being
elected pursuant to the constitution, hardly constitutes a unitary
executive. 2' Responsibility and accountability are diffused.5z
Proposals for a short ballot, eliminating the election of all but a
few of those eight Council of State members and having any
replacement positions filled by appointment, have abounded
throughout the twentieth century.' z A short ballot amendment
should be adopted in order to promote greater responsibility and
accountability throughout the executive branch bureaucracy. Where
the cut should be made is debatable public policy, and practical
520. See N.C. CONST. art. III, § 7(1); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143A-11 (Supp. 1998); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 143B-6 (1997).
521. See Robin Dorff, Shorten the Ballot: Appointing the Council of State Would
Ensure Accountability, CAROLINA J., Dec. 1992-Jan. 1993, at 12; Guillory, supra note 139,
at 40.
522. See Dorff, supra note 521, at 13; Guillory, supra note 139, at 40.
523. See supra notes 85-91 and 130-33 and accompanying text; see also Steelman, supra
note 75, at 412 (noting support for the short ballot earlier in the century by the influential
newspaper editor Josephus Daniels and the reformist historian Joseph G. de Roulhac
Hamilton); Record on Appeal, Plaintiffs Exhibit 19, at 10-13, State ex rel. Martin v. Melott,
320 N.C. 518, 359 S.E.2d 783 (1987) (No. 61PA87) (consisting of a paper presented to the
Constitution Study Commission of 1968 by political scientist Preston W. Edsall advocating
a short ballot amendment to the constitution). The Constitution Study Commission of
1968 unsuccessfully proposed a short ballot amendment under which only the auditor,
treasurer, and attorney general would be elected constitutional officers and under which
the other five positions could be replaced by appointed statutory officers. See 1968
REPORT, supra note 100, at 47-49. Most recent attention to the subject of a short ballot
has been confined to the single office of the superintendent of public instruction, one of
the elected members of the Council of State, who also serves as the secretary and chief
administrative officer of the State Board of Education created under the constitution.
That focus results from the obvious interest in education policy and the concern that the
state performs poorly in public education, and the proposals for an appointive position
contemplate greater responsibility and accountability in what is a currently a truly
Byzantine bureaucracy. See Guillory, supra note 139, at 41-42 (discussing Governor
Martin's support for such a proposal in 1987 following the retirement of a superintendent).
Recently, a public-policy foundation proposed a short ballot amendment as well as other
executive reorganization permissible without an amendment. See JOHN LOCKE
FOUNDATION, supra note 435, at 3-7. More recently, proposals for gubernatorial
appointment have been focused on appellate judges. See Act to Amend the Constitution
of North Carolina to Provide for Gubernatorial Appointment of Justices of the Supreme
Court and Judges of the Court of Appeals and Retention by Vote of the People, S. 12,
1999 Sess. (N.C. 1999). That proposed constitutional amendment failed legislative
approval for submission to the voters. See Rob Christensen, Who Killed Merit Plan for
Judges?, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), July 9,1999, at 3A.
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political considerations complicate the matter.524 A serious study of
the issue in 1968 concluded that elective independence was
appropriate only for the auditor, treasurer, and attorney general.
52
Although executive officers, those three elected officials are
presumably competent professionals performing check-and-balance
functions. 26 They are not charged constitutionally with taking "care
that the laws be faithfully executed."'527 Only the governor is so
charged. 28 For the governor to be responsible and accountable, the
governor should appoint the other heads of state government
departments 29
Whether the governor's appointment of department heads and
other state officers should be restricted by a requirement of Senate
advice and consent, as contemplated in the current appointments
clause,5 30 or subject to confirmation by the General Assembly in joint
session 531 is also a debatable issue of public policy.532 Political
considerations complicate the potential resolution 3 3 Again, just as
on the issue of the short ballot, the 1968 study concluded that the
constitution should be amended to provide for gubernatorial
appointment of all department heads without any requirement for
legislative consent or confirmation. 534  The General Assembly has
implicitly agreed by providing for gubernatorial appointment of nine
department heads without requiring consent or confirmation.535 In
524. See Guillory, supra note 139, at 42 (noting that each elective Council of State
member has his own political base and special-interest support, and quoting one member,
who said, " 'You take one off the ballot and then the question is which one's next.' ").
525. See supra note 130-33 and accompanying text.
526. See N.C. CONST. art. III, §§ 7(1)-(2); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 143A-25 (prescribing
duties of the auditor), -31 (prescribing duties of the treasurer), -49.1 (prescribing duties of
the attorney general) (1994).
527. N.C. CONST. art. III, § 5(4).
528. See id.
529. See, e.g., NATIONAL MUN. LEAGUE, MODEL STATE CONSTTUTION 72 (6th ed.
1968).
530. See N.C. CONST. art. III, § 5(8).
531. See id. art. IX, § 4(1) (state board of education).
532. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143B-9 (1997) (providing for gubernatorial appointment of
non-elected department heads, and illustrating another public policy option).
533. The North Carolina Senate and House have had different views on the
advisability of changing from elective to appointive offices. See Guillory, supra note 139,
at 42 (noting that in 1987 the Senate passed an amendment calling for the appointment of
the superintendent of public instruction while a House committee rejected the proposal);
Christensen, supra note 523 (noting that in 1999, the Senate passed an amendment calling
for the appointment of appellate judges while the House rejected the proposal).
534. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
535. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143B-9 (1997). The section provides: "The head of each
principal State department, except those departments headed by popularly elected
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doing so, the General Assembly has provided a statutory model for
gubernatorial appointment of the department heads over much of the
executive bureaucracy. This model should be extended by
constitutional amendment to all of the executive bureaucracy.536
V. CONCLUSION
Simple civics lessons provide the model for fulfilling North
Carolina's proclaimed separation of powers: With an already
powerful legislature to enact the laws and with an independent
judiciary to interpret them, the state needs a unitary executive-the
governor, often acting through his appointed subordinate officers-to
execute them.537 A unitary executive can be achieved only through a
short ballot amendment to the constitution. After nearly a century of
unsuccessful advocacy of such reform, perhaps the twenty-first
century will bring success. As part of that reform, the governor's
power to appoint and remove his subordinate officers should be
protected. Such reform would better enable the governor to "take
care that the laws be faithfully executed.1538 Then, the powers that
the people have delegated to their state government will truly "be
forever separate and distinct from each other." '539
officers, shall be appointed by the Governor and serve at his pleasure." Id. Even if the
appointments clause of the North Carolina Constitution of 1971, see N.C. CONST. art. HI,
§ 5(8), were given the interpretation argued by Governor Martin and rejected by the court
in Martin v. Melott, see supra notes 216-28 and accompanying text, the General Assembly
can dispense with the necessity of Senate consent to gubernatorial appointments. See
State ex rel. Howerton v. Tate, 68 N.C. 546, 551 (1873). But cf. State ex rel. Salisbury v.
Croom, 167 N.C. 223, 227, 83 S.E. 354, 355 (1914) (emphasizing the Senate's role in the
appointment process); University R.R. Co. v. Holden, 63 N.C. 410, 423-24 (1869)
(Rodman, J., concurring) (finding no dispensation of consent).
536. Based upon N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143B-9, see supra note 535, the constitutional
provision for administrative departments within the executive branch, see N.C. CONST. art.
III, § 11, and the history of the appointments clause, see note 317, a proposed amendment
would read as follows:
The head of each principal administrative department, except those departments
headed by popularly elected officers [e.g., the auditor, treasurer, and attorney
general], shall be appointed by the Governor and serve at his pleasure, as shall all
subordinate officers of such appointed heads of department. The Governor shall
nominate and by and with the advice and consent of a majority of the Senators
appoint all officers who are members of regulatory, quasi-judicial, and temporary
agencies and all officers whose appointments are not otherwise provided for in
this Constitution, and such officers shall serve at the Governor's pleasure [or, to
authorize for-cause limitations on removal of such officers, may be removed by
the Governor as by law is provided].
537. See Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 179, at 544.
538. N.C. CONST. art. III, § 5(4).
539. Id. art. I, § 6.
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